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CHAPTER 16 
Zoning and Land Use 
RICHARD G. HUBER* 
A. ZoNING 
§16.1. "One family" dwellings: Limitation on number of unre-
lated individuals: Constitutionality. The United States Supreme 
Court was asked to consider an equal protection challenge to a local 
zoning ordinance during the Survey year in Village of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas. 1 Belle Terre is a small incorporated village of about 700 peo-
ple on the north shore of Long Island. By ordinance, the village lim-
ited the permissible land use to one family dwellings, "family" being 
defined as: 
One or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, liv-
ing and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive 
of household servants. A number of persons but not exceeding 
two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit 
though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage, shall be 
deemed to constitute a family. 2 
The owners of a house in Belle Terre leased it to two students. Four 
other students subsequently moved in, bringing to six the number of 
unrelated students residing in the house. The local authorities or-
dered the owners to remedy the violation of the zoning ordinance, 
whereupon the owners and three of the students sought an i~unction 
under section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code declaring 
tht. ordinance unconstitutional. The United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York ruled that the ordinance was valid,3 
but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 4 The case 
*RICHARD G. HUBER is Dean and Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. The 
author wishes to acknowledge the extensive help of Christopher C. Mansfield and Samuel 
Christopher Stowe, students at the law school, in the preparation of this chapter. 
§16.1. I 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
2 Building Zone Ordinance of the Village of Belle Terre, Art. I,§ D-1.35a Qune 8, 1970), 
quoted in 416 U.S. at 2. 
3 Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 367 F. Supp. 136, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
4 Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 818 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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reached the Supreme Court on appeal. 
The owners and students argued, inter alia, that the ordinance was 
violative of equal protection in that it interferes with the right to 
travel and the right to migrate and settle within a state, bars life styles 
not agreeable to the present residents (and in so doing infringes the 
newcomers' rights of privacy), and in general "is antithetical to the 
Nation's experience, ideology, and self-perception as an open, 
egalitarian, and integrated society."5 
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, found no merit in any of 
the petitioners' claims. 6 The Court refused to classify the rights al-
legedly abridged by the ordinance as "fundamental"7 and therefore 
refused to apply the "strict scrutiny" or "compelling state interest" 
tests8 to the Belle Terre ordinance. Thus the ordinance was subjected 
to the traditional test in equal protection cases - namely, whether the 
classification made by the legislative enactment bears a "rational rela-
tionship to a permissible state objective."9 The Court did not explicitly 
reject the Second Circuit's intermediate test of whether the denial of 
equal protection by creation of a legislative classification was in fact 
"substantially related" to a lawful governmental objective. 1 0 The Second 
Circuit suggested that this test, which it extrapolated from recent 
Supreme Court decisions,11 be applied when an infringed right does 
not reach the level of a "fundamental right" but is more basic and 
personal than commercial interests12 of the type involved in Lindsley v. 
Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 13 and McGowan v. Maryland. 14 This sub silen-
tio treatment of the Second Circuit's new intermediate test indicates 
the Supreme Court's strict adherence, at least in the zoning area, to 
the established "two-tiered" formula for dealing with equal protection 
cases. 15 
5 416 U.S. at 7. 
6 Id. 
'I d. 
8 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,634,638 (1969). 
9 416 U.S. at 8. Sec McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Lindsley v. 
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). Justice Marshall, dissenting in Belle 
Terre, expressed the opinion that the ordinance's classification between related and unre-
lated individuals infringed on the students' fundamental rights of association and privacy 
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and, therefore, should have been 
subjected to the "strict scru'tiny" test. 416 U.S. at 13 (dissenting opinion). 
10 See 476 F.2d at 813-15. 
11 476 F.2d at814, citing, inter alia, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,446-55 (1972); Reed 
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,76 (1971). 
12 Id. at 813-14, 815. 
13 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (stockholder of carbonic gas company sought injunction against 
enforcement of state statute which made unlawful the collection and sale of carbonic acid gas 
from natural mineral springs). 
14 366 U.S. 420 ( 1961) (employees of department store' challenged the constitutionality of 
Maryland's Sunday Closing Laws, which prohibited the sale on Sundays of all but certain 
specified products). 
15 But cf. 88 Harv. L. Rev. 119, 124-25, 127-28 (1974). 
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In applying the "rational relationship" test to the facts of the instant 
case, the Court concluded that no right of the plaintiffs had been un-
constitutionally infringed.16 The Court found that the legitimate gov-
ernmental interests in open yards, quiet streets, and a limited number 
of people were rationally served by the enactment and enforcement of 
the local ordinance in question.U 
Lastly, the Court rejected the contention that the controversy was 
moot because the students had moved out Qf the house. In so hold-
ing, the majority reasoned that the impact of the Belle Terre ordi-
nance on the value of the lessors' property created a cognizable 
controversy. 18 The Court stated: "[I]t is obvious that the scale of rent-
al values rides on what we decide today."19 Thus the Court reversed 
the Second Circiut and upheld the ordinance as a valid exercise of 
the police power rationally related to permissible governmental 
objectives. 20 
The majority opinion initially recited the factual situations and 
rationales of several historic land use regulation cases, including Euclid 
v. Ambler Realty Co. 21 and Berman v. Parker.22 Although Euclid and 
Berman were essentially due process cases while the central issue in 
Belle Terre was equal protection-thus leaving the reasons behind the 
Court's review of these cases somewhat unclear-it seems that the 
Court intended to indicate that it will continue to exercise restraint in 
dealing with zoning ordinances. This interpretation is bolstered by the 
majority's refusal to elevate the deprivations alleged by the petitioners 
to "fundamental" right status and to apply either the "strict scrutiny" 
test or the intermediate "substantial relationship" test to the Belle 
Terre ordinance. 
§16.2. Zoning by-law: Reasonableness. Challenging the validity 
of a zoning by-law in Massachusetts is a difficult task since a heavy 
burden is placed on the landowner to establish that the by-law is in 
conflict with either the Zoning Enabling Act1 or applicable constitu-
tional provisions. 2 In Maider v. Town of Dover,3 decided by the Appeals 
16 4I6 U.S. at 7-9. 
17 Id. at 9. 
1& Id. 
19 Id. justice Brennan disagreed with this analysis since, in his view, the challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Belle Terre ordinance was based solely on alleged infringement of 
the rights of tenants. I d. at I 0 (dissenting opinion). Accordingly, he would have r~manded 
the case to the district court for a determination as to whether a cognizable case or con-
troversy still existed. ld. at I2 (dissenting opinion). 
20 I d. at 8-9, I 0. 
21 272 u.s. 365 (1926). 
22 348 u.s. 26 (1954). 
§16.2. 1 G.L. c. 40A, §§ 1-22. 
2 E.g., Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1303, 1312, 284 
N.E.2d 891, 899; Pierce v. Town of Wellesley, 336 Mass. 517, 521, 146 N.E.2d 666, 669 
(1957). 
3 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 37, 306 N.E.2d 274. 
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Court during the Survey year, the petitioner owned and operated a 
full service gas station as a non-conforming use in a residentially 
zoned district. Since 1969 petitioner had attempted to get permission 
to modernize and expand the non-conforming service station. In that 
year a request for a special permit was refused because the by-law did 
not contain any provision for this type of exception, and subsequent 
articles to amend the by-law for the purpose of rezoning the locus 
were defeated in town meetings. 
Petitioner filed a bill for declaratory relief in superior court chal-
lenging the validity of the zoning by-law on the basis that, as applied 
to his land, it exceeded the scope of the Zoning Enabling Act. 
Petitioner asserted that increases in population, residential building, 
and traffic along the street fronting the locus rendered the inclusion 
of his land in a residential district so arbitrary and unreasonable that, 
as a matter of law, it resulted in confiscation.4 The superior court de-
nied the requested declaratory relief and held that the town could 
continue to zone the locus and the surrounding area for residential 
use since, although a residential use of the locus might not be its best 
use, it was nevertheless not impractical. 5 
The Appeals Court affirmed, holding that the mere fact that the 
petitioner would be unable to put his land to its most profitable use 
did not amount to an unconstitutional deprivation of his property and 
was not sufficient reason for invalidating the zoning by-law.6 The 
court distinguished Maider from cases in which application of a zoning 
by-law results in substantial injury to the landowner and only trivial 
benefit to the public. 7 
The Appeals Court also indicated its agreement with the superior 
court that the Dover by-law represented a valid exercise of the police 
power. 8 The trial court judge had ruled that because of dangers as-
sociated with the storage of gasoline and the detrimental effect of the 
noise, odors and traffic associated with the operation of a gas station, 
exclusion of gas stations from residential districts is reasonably related 
to the public health, safety, and welfare. 9 
Acknowledging that the test of whether a zoning by-law represents 
a lawful exercise of the police power depends on whether it can be 
characterized as having a rational relation to the public health, safety, 
or morals, 10 the Appeals Court stated: "If the reasonableness of the 
4 Id. at 39-40, 306 N.E.2d at 277. 
5 I d. at40, 306 N.E.2dat 277. The petitioner's expert had testified that while the locus had 
a value of $10,000 "as a piece of land for single-family residence," id., its value if used as a 
gasoline station was $100,000. ld. at 42, 306 N.E.2d at 278. 
6 Id. at 42, 306 N.E.2d at 278. 
7 I d., distinguishing Jenckes v. Building Comm'r of Brookline, 341 Mass. 162, 166, 167 
N.E.2d 757, 760 (1960). 
8 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 42, 306 N.E.2d at 278. 
9 Id. at 40, 306 N.E.2d at 277. 
10 Id. at 41, 306 N.E.2d at 277-78. 
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by-law is fairly debatable, the judgment of the local legislative body 
responsible for its enactment must be sustained. Every presumption is 
to be made in favor of its validity."11 Various factors-such as loca-
tion, size and physical characteristics of the locus, and the nature and 
use of other land in the vicinity-should be taken into consideration 
when determining the reasonableness of the by-law as applied to the 
locus. 12 However, the court stated that "[n]on-productiveness of in-
come and deprivation of some beneficial use, while material, are not 
the sole determining factors." 13 
§ 16.3. Invalid by-law: Denial of permit. In a rescript opinion in 
Pastan v. Board of Appeals of Billerica,! the Appeals Court reversed a 
superior court decree holding that the board of appeals exceeded its 
authority in denying the plaintiff a permit for the erection of an 
apartment house. 2 The Appeals Court relied solely upon Hallenborg v. 
Town Clerk of Billerica. 3 That case involved a challenge to the validity 
of a zoning amendment which had been adopted with less than the 
fourteen days notice of the planning board hearing required by sec-
tion 6 of the Zoning Enabling Act. 4 The Supreme Judicial Court in 
Hallenborg had held that since the zoning amendment had been 
adopted without adequate notice, the decree of the superior court de-
nying the mandatory relief requested by the petitioners5 should be 
reversed. 6 The Hallenborg Court ruled in addition, however, that 
mandamus was not to be issued for at least nine months, in order to 
permit adoption of either the same zoning amendment in full com-
pliance with section 6 of the Zoning Enabling Act or a provision to 
protect persons who relied in good faith on the validity of the 
amendment. 7 
The plaintiff in Pastan relied upon the identical section of the 
town's zoning by-law that had been the subject of the controversy in 
Hallenborg. The Appeals Court saw itself called upon to decide 
whether the Hallenborg decision had invalidated that section of the Bil-
11 Id., 306 N.E.2d at 278. 
t2 Id. 
t3 Id. 
§16.3. 1 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 6ll, 311 N.E.2d 588. 
2 Id. 
3 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1681,275 N.E.2d 525. For a discussion of this case, see Huber,Land 
Use Law, 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§ 22.2, at 619-20. 
4 G.L. c. 40A, § 6. 
5 The petitioners in Hallenborg had sought a writ of mandamus (1) to compel the town 
clerk to strike the amendment \n question from the Billerica zoning by-law and (2) to order 
the town building inspector to enforce the zoning by-law as it existed prior to the amend-
ment and to revoke all permits issued under the amendment. 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1681, 
275 N.E.2d at 527. 
6 ld. at 1688, 275 N.E.2d at 531. 
7 Id. at 1686-87, 275 N.E.2d at 530-31. 
5
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lerica zoning by-law. The court concluded that Hallenborg had indeed 
had that effect notwithstanding the "protective provisions . . . made 
for the intervenors in that decision,"8 and noted that, in any event, 
Pastan had not shown that he was entitled to the benefits of those 
protective provisions. 9 
§16.4. Zoning boundaries: Division of single tract into two 
zones. In Moss v. Town of Winchester, 1 the petitioner challenged the 
validity of the town's zoning by-law which divided her 85-acre parcel 
into two districts. The front portion of the locus, to a depth of 150 
feet, was placed in single residence district B, which required lot sizes 
of 15,000 square feet. The rear portion was placed in single residence 
district A, which required lot sizes of 20,000 square feet. 
The petitioner set forth several grounds for the invalidity of the 
by-law. First, she argued that the differing treatment within her 
homogeneous parcel of real estate was unreasonable and in violation 
of the Zoning Enabling Act. 2 Secondly, while the petitioner had re-
ceived a permit, under sections 20-23 of chapter 40B of the General 
Laws, 3 to construct low and moderate income apartments on a portion 
of the land, she nevertheless asserted the unconstitutionality of the 
zoning by-law in preventing her from using her entire tract for gar-
den apartments.4 Finally, the petitioner argued that Winchester's pro-
hibition of apartments in residential zones, while allowing such uses as 
hospitals and rest homes, was arbitrary and unreasonable, and that, in 
any case, the total exclusion of apartments from Winchester under the 
zoning by-law in force at the time the petition was filed violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 
The land court found the by-law to be valid and dismissed the 
petition.6 In affirming the land court's decision, 7 the Supreme Judicial 
Court utilized a flat rule to sustain the by-law: 
The test for validity of a zoning by-law is whether it furthers 
any purpose included within G.L. c. 40A, §§ 2, 3 .... Such a by-
law is presumed valid, ... and will be upheld unless arbitrary and 
unreasonable .... When the reasonableness of a zoning by-law is 
8 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 611, 311 N.E.2d at 588. 
9 Id. 
§16.4. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 755,311 N.E.2d 555. 
2 I d. at 756,311 N.E.2d at 556. The petitioner's argument that the division of her land into 
two zones violated the Zoning Enabling Act, G.L. c. 40A, §§ 1-22, was based on the 
requirement of G.L. c. 40A, § 2 that "[d]ue regard shall be paid to the characteristics of the 
different parts of the ... town and the Zoning regulations ... shall be the same for wnes, districts 
or streets having substantially the same character." Id. (emphasis added). 
3 G.L. c. 40B, §§ 20-23 is the Massachusetts "Anti-Snob" Zoning Law. 
• 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 755-56, 311 N.E.2d at 556. 
5 Id. at 757, 311 N.E.2d at 557. 
6 Id. at 755, 3ll N.E.2d at 556. 
7 Id. at 759, 311 N.E.2d at 558. 
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fairly debatable, the judgment of the local legislative body must be 
sustained. . . . The burden to prove otherwise rests on the 
petitioner .... The fact that land is made less profitable thereby 
does not invalidate a by-law. 8 
The Court did not directly confront the issue of differing treatment 
within a homogeneous parcel of real estate. Instead, the Court fo-
cused upon the fact that the petitioner's property straddled a district 
line. Relying on the rule that it is normal and reasonable to draw 
boundaries between districts with regard to the placement of major 
traffic arteries, the Court concluded that the town's district designa-
tion should prevail, even though the district boundaries bisected 
petitioner's land. 9 The Court did indicate, however, that lot sizes 
within the same district must be uniform.10 
The petitioner's equal protection claim-based upon Winchester's 
total exclusion of apartments under the zoning by-law in force at the 
time the petition was filed-was mooted by the amendment of the 
by-law in 1972 to provide for the construction of apartments.U How-
ever, the Supreme Judicial Court's dictum in regard to this issue 
seems to indicate that it is not likely to be persuaded by the equal pro-
tection argument. 12 The Court noted that Girsh Appeal/ 3 a Pennsyl-
vania case supporting the petitioner's equal protection claim, repre-
sents only a minority viewpoint, 14 and later held that it is permissible 
for a zoning by-law to maintain an area as predominantly one of 
single family residences. 15 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court did not reach the merits of 
the petitioner's equal protection claim, that argument provided the 
most interesting issue in the case. With new single-family homes well 
out of the financial reach of the majority of American families, it is 
clear that suburban communities in the process of being built up can 
keep many people out by zoning solely for single-family residences. 
Since the great majority of racial minorities are at the lower end of 
8 I d. at 7 56, 311 N .E.2d at 556. 
9 Id. at 757, 311 N.E.2d at 557. 
10 Id. at 756-57, 311 N.E.2d at 556-57. 
11 I d. at 757, 311 N .E.2d at 557. The Court dismissed as immaterial the fact that the 1972 
amendment did not permit construction of apartments in the zones in which the petitioner's 
land is situated. Id. 
12 Id. 
13 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (the total exclusion of apartments through zoning laws 
is unconstitutional). 
14 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 757, 311 N.E.2d at 557. 
15 I d. at 758, 311 N.E.2d at 557, citing G.L. c. 40A, § 3; Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 
416 U .S.1 (1974), discussed in § 16.1 supra. Although this holding would not, of course, 
preclude the Court from holding, at a proper time, that the total exclusion of apartments 
from a town was not permissible, it is perhaps indicative of what the Court's inclination 
might be on the issue of total exclusion. 
7
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the economic scale, the result is de facto, if not de jure, segregation. 16 
Constitutional attacks on single-family and large-lot zoning are some-
what difficult to sustain, however, and the procedures of chapter 774 
of the Acts of 1969,17 the so-called "Anti-Snob" Zoning Law, permit-
ting the opening up of communities for low and moderate income 
housing, may be more workable. 
§16.5. Floating zone: Assignment to specific property. Adoption 
of amendments to zoning by-laws creating a new type of use district is 
a legislative task which is frequently handled through a town meeting. 
When the purpose of such an amendment is the establishment of a 
new permissible use in the town generally, as opposed to intentional 
application to specific pieces of property, the new zoning designation 
is often referred to as a "floating zone." The town of Natick in 1969 
amended its by-law by creating a new "Planned Cluster Development" 
(PCD) use district. 1 In Cere! v. Town of Natick, 2 the Appeals Court con-
firmed the belief that a subsequent legislative procedure is essential 
before a so-called "floating zone" can apply to a particular locus. 
Plaintiff Martin Cere! had attempted unsuccessfully to have the 
town meeting rezone his property as a PCD district. In this action to 
determine the applicability of the amendment to his land, Cere! ar-
gued that the zoning amendment's provision that "only land areas 
containing 4,500,000 square feet or more shall be included in the 
PCD district" created a floating zone on any parcel meeting this area 
requirement and automatically rezoned it as a PCD district without 
further legislative proceedings. 3 The land court rejected Cerel's ar-
gument and the Appeals Court affirmed. 4 
The Appeals Court held that this area requirement-along with 
those concerning design, construction, and operational criteria-was 
to be used only as a guide to determine eligibility for PCD 
designation. 5 Actual rezoning would necessitate a subsequent legisla-
tive proceeding; in this case, a separate vote of the town meeting to 
amend the zoning map. 6 
16 See Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 Yale L.J. 896, 896-97 n.2 (1970). 
17 Acts of 1969, c. 774, codified in G.L. c. 40B, §§ 20-23 and G.L. c. 23B, § SA. For a 
discussion of the "Anti-Snob Zoning Law," see Huber, Land Use, 1973 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§ 12.10, at 415-22; Rodgers, Snob Zoning in Massachusetts, 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law § 
18.2, at 489-94; Comment, 1973 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§ 12.30 at 454-73. 
§ 16.5. 1 PCD zoning does not affect the total number of square feet of land that must be 
allotted to each house built in such a district, but permits houses in a parcel to be built in a 
"cluster," leaving the remaining land undeveloped. The advantage to a developer of PCD 
zoning is that houses can be built closer together than would ordinarily be permitted, thus 
reducing the cost of installing roads, sewers, and other utilities. 
2 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 398,309 N.E.2d 893. 
3 Id. at 398, 309 N.E.2d at 894. 
4 Id. at 398-99, 309 N.E.2d at 894. 
5 Id. at 398, 309 N.E.2d at 894. 
6 Id. at 399, 309 N.E.2d at 894. 
8
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The Appeals Court's decision is consistent with the apparent intent 
of the Natick PCD amendment. Legislative decisions should not be 
dispensed with when clearly required. In situations where a local legis-
lative decision does no more than create a so-called "floating zone," a 
subsequent legislative decision is required in order to have the desig-
nation applied to a particular tract of land. 
§16.6. Variance: Use and non-use variance standards. In Mas-
sachusetts, the present Zoning Enabling Act1 contains specific guide-
lines and requirements for variances.2 No provisions are evident 
which would distinguish between different types of variances or allow 
application of different standards. However, the Appeals Court's re-
sponse to the facts in Tutela v. Hines 3 suggests that while the court will 
show a guarded concern in preserving the rigid requirements of sec-
tion 15(3) of chapter 40A for "use" variances, it may assume a more 
relaxed attitude with respect to "non-use" variances such as signs. 
The petitioner originally brought an action challenging the Foxboro 
board of appeals' grant of a variance to a developing industrial park 
for the erection and display of two signs which exceeded the size 
limits established in the town by-law. Without a variance, that by-law 
would have limited the owner of the locus to a single sign not to ex-
ceed forty square feet in area.4 The superior court upheld the board's 
granting of the variance which allowed the developers to construct 
two signs in excess of the permitted size. 5 The Appeals Court af-
firmed the superior court's findings that the signs would not result in 
a substantial detriment to the public good and would not derogate 
substantially from the intent or purpose of the by-law. 6 
It is difficult to determine the rationale for the Appeals Court's de-
cision. Under the strict interpretation of section 15(3) of chapter 40A, 
the presence of hardship is essential; yet here that issue seems not to 
have been considered. One explanation involves the quality of the 
petitioner's brief. Apparently, it was sorely lacking, for the court pub-
licly struck it from the files because it failed to "include any thing 
which can fairly be called argument within the meaning of Rule 
1:15(l)(d) of the Appeals Court."7 The other plausible reason is that 
the court did not believe that a "non-use" variance should be required 
to undergo as stringent a test as a "use" variance. Admittedly, "use" 
variances are more serious in terms of their effect on zoning. This 
distinction may well be a valid one-as to this author it is-and the 
§16.6. I G.L. c. 40A, §§ 1-22. 
2 Id. § 15(3). 
3 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 781,304 N.E.2d 206. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id., 304 N.E.2d at 206-07. 
7 Id., 304 N.E.2d at 207. 
9
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General Court may wish to consider incorporating the distinction into 
section 15(d)(3) of chapter 40A by making the hardship rule inapplic-
able when a variance does not effect a change in land use. 
§16.7. Variance: Derogation from zoning law. In Hunt v. Milton 
Savings Bank, 1 the board of appeals of Milton granted a variance to 
the defendant allowing the building of a bank along with an as-
sociated parking lot. The piece of property on which this construction 
was to take place had been placed in a Residence C district, in which 
construction or alteration for any commercial purpose was forbidden. 
At the time of this appeal the locus was owned by Hoover Motors, 
Inc., which, with the exception of approximately 13% of the total 
land, had previously used the locus as a commercial enterprise for the 
sale, repair, and storage of automobiles. Since this activity had existed 
prior to the adoption of the zoning designation in 1922, its continued 
operation had been permitted as a nonconforming use. 
Three separate actions were brought by the plaintiffs, an abutter 
and others who claimed to be aggrieved by the Milton board's deci-
sion granting the variance to the bank permitting a new commercial 
use of the property. These actions included two bills in equity to have 
the granted variance set aside and a petition for a writ of certiorari 
seeking to quash the board's decision on the ground that the board it-
self was illegally constituted. The three actions were joined and heard 
together in the superior court. 
The superior court set aside the grant of the variance and dismissed 
the petition for certiorari. 2 In his findings, the trial judge noted that 
the "entire area . . . is composed of well kept homes on tree lined 
streets,"3 and that he "could see no use of any of the surrounding 
area which would indicate that variances had been granted on other 
properties."4 
The Appeals Court initially observed that disposition of the equity 
cases hinged on whether the variance could be granted "without nul-
lifying or substantially derogating from the intent or purpose ... [of 
the zoning] by-law,''5 in accordance with section 15(3) of chapter 40A. 
The trial judge stated that he could not "rule that the [b]oard was 
warranted in finding that the variance may be granted without sub-
stantial detriment to the public good and without nullifying or sub-
stantially derogating from the intent or purpose of the zoning 
by-law."6 Although this holding was made without substantiation as 
far as a ruling on the evidence was concerned, it is helpful to re-
§16.7. 1 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 351, 309 N.E.2d 525. 
2 Id. at 352, 309 N.E.2d at 526. 
3 Id. at 354, 309 N.E.2d at 527. 
'I d. 
• Id., quoting G.L. c. 40A, § 15(3). 
6 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 355, 309 N.E.2d at 527-28. 
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member that a denial of a variance does not dictate the more inclusive 
explanation which is demanded in a granting of a variance. Thus, the 
trial court should not be faulted for its decision. 
Noting that the board's decision had merely paraphrased the lan-
guage of section 15(3), and that the validity of the board's decision 
therefore depended on the trial judge's making a finding that the var-
iance could be granted without nullifying or substantially derogating 
from the zoning by-law, the Appeals Court set out to decide whether 
it could provide the missing finding. 7 The court concluded that the 
evidence in the instant case did not warrant such a finding, and that 
the superior court decrees annulling the decision of the board should 
be affirmed. 8 In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that: 
(1) the introduction of a new business into a residential area ... is 
commonly conceded to have a marked depreciating effect upon the 
value of neighboring residential property; (2) the neighborhood here 
was predominantly residential in character; (3) there did not appear 
to have been any change in the neighborhood's basic character since 
the time of the adoption of the original zoning by-law; and (4) no 
other commercial establishment existed in the neighborhood.9 Finally, 
the Appeals Court decided that the plaintiffs' exception to the order 
dismissing the petition was moot because the petition for the writ of 
certiorari was designed to quash the board's decision on the variance 
and the variance had already been set aside. 10 
In this case it seems that the Appeals Court is informing trial courts 
that reasons for a denial of a variance should approach, and perhaps 
meet, the same standard required in the granting of a variance. 
Moreover, the court seems to be warning future seekers of variances 
to have sufficient evidence to show that the variance could be granted 
without substantial derogation from the intent or purpose of the zon-
ing by-law. 
§ 16.8. Variance: Substantial hardship test. Satisfaction of the sub-
stantial hardship requirement of section 15(3) of chapter 40A fre-
quently presents itself as the major hurdle in variance cases. City 
Council of Waltham v. Vinciullo 1 is another case in which this standard 
was determinative. Vinciullo owned two separate four-apartment 
houses on a parcel of land consisting of 20,360 square feet. Because 
of the high cost of renovations (which would have raised rents to a 
figure higher than that which the present tenants would be willing to 
pay) and progressively lower profits from the existing structures, he 
7 Id. 
8 ld. at 357-58, 309 N.E.2d at 529. 
9 Id. at 356, 309 N.E.2d at 528. 
10 Id. at 358, 309 N.E.2d at 529. 
§16.8. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 167, 307 N.E.2d 316. 
11
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sought a space variance to permit the construction of a single building 
containing not more than thirty-one apartments. The locus was 
situated in a Residence C district where, for a structure of that size, 
57,250 square feet was required. 
After the board of appeals granted the requested variance,2 the city 
council filed a bill in equity challenging the board's decision. The 
superior court found no showing of substantial hardship and ordered 
the entry of a decree annulling the variance.3 However, the court 
later vacated its order,4 holding that because of an amendment to sec-
tion 21 of chapter 40A5 which became effective while the instant case 
was pending, the city council no longer had standing to maintain its 
suit.6 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that since the board's decision 
was rendered prior to the effective date of the amendment, it should 
not have been applied retroactively to invalidate the city council's 
appeal. 7 The Court then concluded that since the dwellings could still 
feasibly be used in compliance with the existing zoning laws, no sub-
stantial hardship was present: "There is no substantial hardship 
merely because there may be expense involved in continuing an exist-
ing use ... or because higher profits may result from a nonconform-
ing use .... "8 As a result, the board's granting of the variance was de-
termined to be in excess of its authority and the superior court decree 
was reversed. 9 
While the tone of the Supreme Judicial Court's ruling may seem 
harsh, the policy is indeed sound. As the Court pointed out: "To rule 
otherwise would make it possible for a property owner to obtain a var-
iance merely by permitting his property to deteriorate and become 
unprofitable. Such a result would tend to negate the effectiveness of 
zoning schemes."10 
The Court's discussion of the retroactive nature of procedural and 
remedial statutes, while in no sense limited to zoning cases, is the most 
interesting aspect of this case. The Court's determination that such 
statutory changes shall apply retroactively only to those cases which, 
on the effective date of the statute, have not yet gone beyond the pro-
2 Id., 307 N.E.2d at 317. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 168,307 N.E.2d at 317. 
5 Acts of 1969, c. 706, which deleted the reference in G.L. c. 40A, § 21 to "any municipal 
... board" as one of the parties which may appeal a decision of a board of appeals to the 
superior court. 
6 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 168, 307 N.E.2d at 317. 
7 Id. at 171,307 N.E.2d at 319. 
8 Id. at 174, 307 N.E.2d at 321. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 174 n.9, 307 N.E.2d at 321 n.9. 
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cedural stage to which the statute pertains11 avoids the confusion of 
the older rule stated by Chief Justice Rugg in Hanscom v. Malden & 
Melrose Gas Light Co. 12 Since the rule stated in the present case is one 
of statutory construction, and not of constitutional dimensions, 13 the 
General Court can still assure retroactive application to particular 
cases by an express statement to that effect. 
§16.9. Variances: Failure to state special conditions author-
izing. Williams v. Building Commissioner of the City of Boston 1 exem-
plifies the virtually state-wide standard applicable to the granting of 
variances. Even under the Boston Zoning Code, before the granting 
of a variance can be upheld, the board of appeal must find that cir-
cumstances or conditions exist which are peculiar to the locus but not 
to the neighborhood. 2 Additionally, hardship must be present in the 
sense that if the requested variance were denied, the owner of the 
locus would be deprived of the reasonable use of the land or 
structure. 3 
The plaintiffs in Williams brought a bill in equity as abutting own-
ers, challenging the validity of two decisions of the Boston Board of 
Appeal granting variances to Kasanof's Baking Company, Inc. One 
decision allowed the erection of a warehouse-garage structure in a dis-
trict zoned for apartments; the other permitted the construction of six 
silos for the storage of flour. 4 The silos were to be constructed on the 
bakery locus, which existed as a nonconforming use in an area zoned 
for local business. 
The superior court upheld the board's granting of the variances.5 
However, the trial court, like the board of appeal, failed to state find-
ings establishing the existence of special circumstances or conditions 
11 Id. at 171, 307 N.E.2d at 319. 
12 220 Mass. I, 107 N.E. 426 (1914). Chief justice Rugg stated: 
The general rule of interpretation is that all statutes are prospective in their operation, 
unless an intention that they shall be retrospective appears by necessary implication 
from their words, context or objects when considered in the light of the subject matter, 
the pre-existing state of the law and the effect upon existent rights, remedies and 
obligations .... It is only statutes regulating practice, procedure and evidence, in short, 
those relating to remedies and not affecting substantive rights, that commonly are 
treated as operating retroactively, and as applying to pending actions or causes of 
action. 
Id. at 3, 107 N.E. at 427-28. 
13 See 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 169 n.5, 307 N.E.2d at 318 n.5. 
§16.9. 1 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 567, 301 N.E.2d 456. 
2 Boston, Mass. Zoning Code§ 7-3, quoted in 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 568, 301 
N.E.2d at 457. 
3Jd. 
•. On the issue of whether to allow construction of the silos, the board voted "to grant the 
requested variance and permission for extension of non-conforming use." 1973 Mass. App. 
Ct. Adv. Sh. at 567, 301 N.E.2d at 456. 
5 Id., 301 N.E.2d at 457. 
13
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warranting the variances. Citing numerous precedents, the Appeals 
Court held the grants invalid. 6 
The case presented an additional twist when Kasanof's argued that 
the decision allowing the silos could be characterized as permission for 
extension of a nonconforming use7 (as provided under section 9-1 of 
the Boston Zoning Code8) and should, therefore, be allowed to stand. 
The Appeals Court answered by citing section 18 of chapter 40A 
(substantially adopted in section 8 of the Boston Zoning Enabling 
Act9), which requires the board to "set forth clearly the reason or 
reasons for its decisions" that statutory and by-law standards applica-
ble to the extension of nonconforming uses have been met. 10 Section 
9-1 of the zoning code11 outlines standards of maximum area and 
value for this type of extension, and section 6-3 12 provides conditions 
to safeguard the neighborhood. The Appeals Court noted that the 
board's decision was addressed primarily to the variance aspects of the 
case, and did not directly address the standards of sections 9-1 and 
6-3 of the zoning codeP Since no reference was made to these condi-
tions, the decision permitting an extension of Kasanof's nonconform-
ing use was also held invalid.14 However, since the Appeals Court felt 
that the deficient findings as to the requirements for the extension of 
a nonconforming use were probably remediable at a further hearing, 
this issue was remanded to the board for further proceedings. 15 
§16.10. Variance and special permit: Action in excess of 
authority. Delgaudio v. Board of Appeals of Medford 1 reiterates the sig-
nificance which the courts place upon compliance with specified re-
quirements for variances and special permits. The substantive criteria 
of section 15(3) of chapter 40A must be satisfied if the granting of a 
variance is to be upheld. Likewise, compliance with the procedures of 
both the Zoning Enabling Act2 and accompanying by-laws or ordi-
nances is essential to the validity of a special permit. 
The plaintiffs in Delgaudio owned land across the street from the 
6 Id. at 568, 301 N.E.2d at 457. 
7 See note 4 supra. 
8 Boston, Mass. Zoning Code§ 9-1, quoted in 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 569,301 
N.E.2d at 457-58. 
9 Acts of 1956, c. 665, § 8. 
1o G.L. c. 40A, § 18. 
11 Boston, Mass. Zoning Code§ 9-1, quoted in 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 569, 301 
N.E.2d at 457-58. 
12 Boston, Mass. Zoning Code§ 6-3, quoted in 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at569 n.2, 301 
N.E.2d at 458 n.2. 
13 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 569, 301 N .E.2d at 458. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 569-70, 301 N.E.2d at 458. 
§ 16.10. 1 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 771,303 N.E.2d 126. 
2 G.L. c. 40A, §§ 1-22. See especially G.L. c. 40A, § 4. 
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locus. According to the city's zoning ordinance, motels of over two 
stories were prohibited. The board of appeals granted a variance to 
build a six-story motel on the locus, finding that it would be economi-
cally unfeasible to build a two-story motel. 3 The board also granted a 
special permit to construct a parking lot as an accessory use to both 
the proposed motel and to a restaurant already being operated at the 
same site. 4 
The superior court upheld the board's decisions, but the Appeals 
Court reversed on both issues. 5 In its rescript opinion, the court 
stated that "[t]he finding that it would not be economically feasible to 
build a two-story motel on the site is not sufficient to support the 
granting of the variance."6 Essentially, the policy which the Appeals 
Court is reiterating involves the coupling of the variance requirements 
of "hardship" 7 and "conditions especially affecting [the locus] but not 
affecting generally the zoning district in which it is located."8 Thus, if 
a claim of hardship is to lie, it must be accompanied by a showing that 
except for the use sought under the variance, no other rational use of 
the locus is possible. In this case, although the zoning ordinance al-
lowed two-story motels, it did not restrict the use of the locus to 
motels. The ordinance required only that if a motel were constructed, 
its height had to be limited to two stories. If this was not desirable, al-
ternative rational uses of the locus were possible. Since actual con-
struction of a motel on the locus was not barred, the requirement of 
substantial hardship was not satisfied and the granted variance could 
not be allowed to stand. 
In regard to the special permit for the parking lot, section 16.4 of 
Medford's zoning ordinance required a finding, prior to a granting of 
a special permit, that the approval would result in no adverse effect 
upon the neighborhood. 9 The Appeals Court held that the board's 
failure to comply with this stipulation in granting this special permit, 
and its failure to make a statement of reasons (as required by section 
18 of chapter 40A) supporting its "general recitation of the statutory 
language of § 4 [of chapter 40A]," made its decision void. 10 In the ab-
sence of such a finding and of a statement of reasons for the grant of 
the special permit, the board's decision was properly deemed to ex-
ceed its authority.U 
§16.11. Special permit: Compliance with local standards. The 
3 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 771, 303 N.E.2d at 127. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 772, 303 N.E.2d at 127. 
6 Id. at 771, 303 N.E.2d at 127. 
7 G.L. c. 40A, § 15(3). 
8 Id. 
9 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 772, 303 N.E.2d at 127. 
Io Id. 
11 See id. 
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courts in Massachusetts have repeatedly stressed that for the granting 
of a special permit to be upheld, there must be a showing of adher-
ence to procedural requirements in order to establish compliance with 
statutory and by-law regulations. 1 This policy was reiterated during 
the 197 4 Survey year in Pierce v. Board of Appeals of Carver. 2 
The board of appeals granted a special permit which would have al-
lowed a use of a parcel of land as a mobile home park. 3 Plaintiff, an 
abutter, brought a bill in equity challenging the validity of the board's 
decision. The superior court dismissed the bill4 and plaintiff appealed. 
The Appeals Court noted that under section VII B 2 of the Carver 
zoning by-law, the board of appeals' power to grant special permits 
was conditioned on the board's finding that the use involved would 
not be "detrimental to the established or future character of the neigh-
borhood and town .... "5 Because this prerequisite is clearly stated in 
the zoning by-law, a failure to produce this finding results in a void 
decision. Since neither the board nor the superior court made such a 
finding, the decision to grant the special permit was annulled on the 
ground that the board acted in excess of its authority. 6 
Although the Appeals Court in Pierce evinced a willingness to re-
view the evidence, it indicated that consideration of the economic im-
pact of the mobile home park on the town would not provide an ade-
quate substitute for a finding as to the park's impact on the character 
of the town. 7 The court also stressed the required scope of the 
finding, i.e., that possible detrimental effects would have to be deter-
mined for both the town and the neighborhood. 8 
The decision seems to say that the court will tolerate an implied 
finding. 9 However, where, as here, the requirement is stated in the 
zoning by-law, an express finding, to support the premise that a 
granting of a special permit is not arbitrary, should be preferred. 
§16.12. Special permits: Inferred valid uses. Through special 
permits local communities are able to regulate and determine use ex-
ceptions to zoning designations. In Board of Appeals of Webster v. Z & K 
§16.11. 1 See, e.g.,Josephs v. Board of Appeals, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1405, 1408-14, 285 
N.E.2d436, 438-42. For a discussion of this case, see Huber, Land Use Law, 1972 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law§ 22.11, at 639. 
2 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 189, 307 N.E.2d 587. 
3 Id., 307 N.E.2d at 588. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 190, 307 N.E.2d at 588, quoting Zoning By-law of the Town of Carver,§ VII B 2 
(emphasis added by court). 
6 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 190, 307 N.E.2d at 588. 
7 See id. 
8 Id. at 190-91, 307 N.E.2d at 588-89. 
9 "Neither the board nor the judge made a finding, express or implied, to the effect that the 
use of the locus for a mobile home park would not be detrimental to the established or future 
character of the town." Id. at 190, 307 N.E.2d at 588 (emphasis added). 
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Enterprises, Inc., 1 application was made for a special permit to use cer-
tain land designated "Agricultural-Single Family Residential" as a 
mobile home park. The Webster zoning by-law authorized the grant-
ing of special permits for hotel or tourist courts in such a district. The 
town board of appeals denied the application, and its decision was 
upheld by the superior court. 2 The Appeals Court, holding that the 
permitted exceptions listed within the special permit section of the 
zoning by-laws were exclusive, affirmed the decree of the superior 
court. 3 Thus, the by-law could not be broadly construed to include 
other excertions not specifically mentioned. "It is not enough that a 
use for which a special permit IS sought be 'consistent' or 'compatible' 
with a specific use for which the by-law states such a permit may be 
granted."4 
The court was correct in its decision not to make exceptions to local 
zoning by-laws. The applicant's proper remedy is to propose an 
amendment to the by-law at the next town meeting. 
§16.13. Building permit: Exemption from new zoning rules. 
Section 11 of chapter 40A exempts the holder of a building permit 
from the effect of any zoning ordinance, by-law, or amendment if the 
permit was issued prior to notice of the planning board hearing on 
the ordinance, by-law or amendment. 1 Protection of the right to con-
struct the nonconforming facility is preserved only if construction has 
begun within six months from the date the building permit was issued 
and "the work ... proceeds in good faith continuously to completion 
so far as is reasonably practicable under the circumstances."2 In Smith 
v. Board of Appeals of Brookline,3 the Supreme Judicial Court clarified 
section 11 by examining the circumstances in which the six-month 
period can be tolled; what constitutes construction sufficient to satisfy 
the statute; and with what degree of strictness the six-month limita-
tion will be applied. 
In 1968, the owner's predecessor was granted a special permit al-
lowing construction of an apartment building which did not conform 
to the height and floor area ratio requirements of the zoning by-law. 
On November 2, 1970, the same party filed an application for a build-
ing permit which took advantage of the dimensional variations of the 
1968 special permit. A suit challenging the 1968 special permit was in-
§16.12. 1 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 573,301 N.E.2d 578. 
2 Id., 301 N.E.2d at 579. 
3 Id. The Appeals Court noted that G.L. c. 40A, § 4 requires uses allowed only through 
special permits "to be 'of a character set forth in . .. [the] by-law.' "1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. 
Sh. at 573, 301 N.E.2d at 579 (emphasis added by court). 
4 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 573, 301 N.E.2d at 579. 
§16.13. I G.L. c. 40A, § 11. 
2 Id. 
3 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1387, 316 N.E.2d 501. 
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itiated on November 9, 1970. Pursuant to section 207d of the Brook-
line building code, the building commissioner in January 1971 gave 
permission "for excavation, footings and the erection of foundation 
forms."4 Section 207d, which allows the issuance of "excavation per-
mits," expressly provides that the holder of such a permit "'shall pro-
ceed at his own risk and without assurance that a permit for the 
super-structure will be granted.' "5 A request for extension of the ex-
cavation permit was made on June 11, 1971, and on June 15 the 
building commissioner responded in a letter practically identical to his 
January letter with the added notation that the requested extension 
had been granted. Ownership of the property was transferred in Au-
gust 1971 and at the same time new plans were submitted. These new 
plans did not take advantage of the 1968 special permit provisions. 
Thereafter, the building inspector gave oral permission to begin con-
struction. 
On October 14, 1971, notice was given of a hearing before the 
planning board on the proposed new zoning provisions. Six days 
later, on October 20, 1971, another application for a building permit 
was filed based upon the new plans. That same day, the commissioner 
sent a new letter granting permission for excavation. He sent another 
letter on December 13, 1971 extending the starting time of the pro-
ject for 90 days from that date. Finally, on May 26, 1972, the commis-
sioner wrote a letter stating that the permit was granted, and he en-
dorsed the reverse side of the October 1972 permit application noting 
that the permit had been granted. 
The board of appeals denied the plaintiff's appeal from the grant-
ing of the building permit and the superior court annulled that 
decision. 6 The trial judge found that neither actual construction nor 
excavation work had begun before the middle of December 1971, 
thus preventing the holders of the permits from receiving the protec-
tion granted by section 11 of chapter 40A. 7 
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Supreme Judicial Court 
sidestepped the issue of whether the building commissioner's letters of 
January 28, 1971 or June 15, 1971, each issued under the authority 
of section 207d of the Brookline building code, constituted the ap-
propriate type of permit for section 11 protection. 8 (The Court noted 
that the oral approval of the new plans submitted on August 5 and 
August 13, 1971 could not constitute a permit because sections 206b 
and 207a of the Brookline building code were not adhered to, i.e., 
"[n]o application was filed, no fee was paid, and no document of any 
4 Id. at 1388, 316 N.E.2d at 502. 
5 Id. at 1389, 316 N.E.2d at 502, quoting Brookline, Mass. Building Code,§ 207d. 
6 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1387,316 N.E.2d at 502. 
7 Id. at 1390, 316 N.E.2d at 503. 
8 Id. at 1391,316 N.E.2d at 503. 
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kind was issued."9 ) Instead, the Court assumed arguendo that for the 
purposes of coverage under section 11 of chapter 40A, the letter of 
June 15, 1971 could serve as a building permit. 10 Using this date as a 
starting point, the protective period under section 11 would extend 
only until December 15, 1971, and construction would have to have 
begun by that time. By determining that the trial judge was not 
plainly wrong in her finding as to the date when construction began, 
the Court held that section 11 did not exempt the owner from the 
new provisions of the town zoning by-law. 11 The Court noted that 
even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defen-
dants, the most that occurred prior to December 15, 1971 was "pre-
liminary excavation."12 While questions could be raised as to whether 
preliminary excavation amounts to the commencement of construction 
called for by section 11, the Court did not decide this issue because of 
the trial court's findings. 13 From this part of the decision it is clear 
that the six-month period of section 11 is to be rigidly enforced. 
The board of appeals, the owner, and the builder to whom the May 
26, 1972 permit was issued cited Belfer v. Building Commissioner of 
Boston 14 in support of their argument that the six-month period 
should be tolled in this case, since "real practical impediments" to be-
ginning construction prevented them from taking advantage of the 
six-month period. 15 The Supreme Judicial Court held that the six-
month period should not be tolled in the instant case because the 
litigation here was terminated by the new owner's decision to abandon 
the special permit and file new plans. 16 The Court refused to extend 
the standard of "real practical impediments to the use of a benefit"17 
to a situation in which the aggrieved party has the power to remove 
the impediment at will. 18 If one has the power to remove the imped-
iment at will, then there really is no impediment. 
Finally, the Court commented that section 11 should be interpreted 
9 Id. at 1390 n.2, 316 N.E.2d at 503 n.2. 
10 Id. at 1390, 316 N.E.2d at 503. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 1391, 316 N.E.2d at 504. 
14 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 607, 294 N.E.2d 857. Belfer held that a zoning provision which 
caused a variance to expire within two years if not used must be tolled while the variance 
itself is the subject of an appeal. Id. at 612, 294 N.E.2d at 860. The Belfer Court stated: 
[R]elief from time limitations ... should ... be given where an appeal from the 
granting of the variance creates ... real practical impediments to the use of a benefit. 
Otherwise a variance which was lawfully awarded can be frustrated by the delay 
inherent in an appeal. Unless an appeal tolls the time period, many variances would be 
meaningless. 
I d. 
15 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1391, 316 N.E.2d at 504. 
16 Id. at 1392, 316 N.E.2d at 504. 
17 See note 14 supra. 
18 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1392, 316 N.E.2d at 504. 
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as affording protection from zoning changes to good faith holders of 
building permits received before the first notice of zoning hearings 
"who proceed with some diligence to build under such permits."19 It 
is not intended to create "a permanent license to construct a building 
for a non-conforming use."20 
Section 11 is designed to afford some reasonable period of protec-
tion to a landowner who has advanced toward use of his property in a 
manner that no longer complies with the applicable zoning regulation. 
Because it constitutes an exception to the general rule that zoning is 
effective when adopted, it clearly should be limited. While it is clear 
that in some situations a landowner may not reasonably be able to 
meet the six-month period for commencement of construction, this 
probably should not result in the tolling of the statute, even though 
the Court in the present case intimates its probable willingness to toll 
the six-month period upon a showing of "real practical impedi-
ments."21 The six-month period is a period of grace and permits 
the landowner to use his property in a way that the legislative body 
of the municipality has determined should not be permitted. One 
can argue that the public decision should prevail over the private one, 
and as long as the landowner is still able to make suitable use of his 
land, it would appear that the Court is correct in applying this peri-
od-of-grace statute narrowly, even when the result may be an un-
happy one for the landowner. 
§16.14. Exemption of public service corporations from local 
zoning. Under section 10 of chapter 40A, the Department of Public 
Utilities (DPU) has the authority, following public notice and hearing, 
to exempt a "public service corporation" from local zoning ordinances 
or by-laws. 1 The underlying reason for this authority is that the ex-
emption is reasonably necessary for the convenience or welfare of the 
public. The plaintiff municipality in Town of Truro v. Department of 
Public Utilities2 raised the issue of whether a small tour corporation is 
a "public service corporation" for the purposes of section 10 and is 
thereby permitted an exemption from the town's zoning by-law. 
The tour company, Drifting Sands Dune Tours, Inc., transported 
passengers for sightseeing purposes on a fixed route into the Cape 
Cod National Seashore, pursuant to a DPU certificate of public con-
venience and necessity, a license from the town under section 1 of 
chapter 159A, and a permit from the National Park Service. The 
19 Id. 
20 Id., quoting Papalia v. Inspector of Bldgs. of Watertown, 351 Mass. 176, 179, 217 
N.E.2d 911, 914 (1966). 
21 See 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1391, 316 N.E.2d at 504. 
§16.14. I G.L. c. 40A, § 10. 
2 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 889,312 N.E.2d 566. 
20
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1974 [1974], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1974/iss1/19
366 1974 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §16.14 
company operated three seven-passenger vehicles. 
The factor initiating the controversy in the present case was the is-
suance by the DPU of a permit allowing the construction of a terminal 
and parking facility in Truro at a locus where such use was prohibited 
by the town's zoning by-law. In its decision that the carrier's use of its 
terminal facility was reasonably necessary for the convenience and 
welfare of the public, the Department apparently thought that the 
sightseeing carrier was within the definition of "public service corpo-
ration" enunicated in Attorney General v. Haverhill Gas Light Co. 3 A 
"public service corporation" was there defined as "one private in its 
ownership but having an appropriate franchise from the State to pro-
vide for a necessity or convenience of the general public incapable of 
being furnished through the ordinary channels of private competitive 
business and dependent for its exercise upon eminent domain or 
some agency of government."4 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court 
affirmed the decision of the DPU.5 
Recognizing that the language of Haverhill Gas was not primarily di-
rected toward problems presented by "common carriers by motor ve-
hicle," the Court proceeded to establish a new standard, fashioned 
from precedent relating to railroads and applicable only to "motor 
vehicles engaged in what might be described as public service 
transportation."6 In a variety of cases, the Court's determination of 
status as a public service corporation has turned upon the quasi-public 
character of the company and the duties owed by it to the public. 7 
Applying this test to the tour company, the Court reiterated that the 
company had a license from the Town of Truro under section 1 of 
chapter 159A and a certificate of public convenience and necessity 
under section 7 of the chapter.8 The Court noted, furthermore, that 
section 10 of chapter 159A established the tour company as a "com-
mon carrier," and that regulation of such carriers rests on their simi-
larity to street railways and railroads. 9 Since the company was "subject 
to the public duties of a common carrier, bound to observe the condi-
tions of its certificate, to observe filed rates and schedules, and to 
serve the public without discrimination,"10 the Supreme Judicial Court 
3 215 Mass. 394, 101 N.E. 1061 (1913). See 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 890,312 N.E.2d at 567. 
4 215 Mass. at 398, 101 N.E. at 1063. It should be noted that in Town of Wenham v. 
Department of Pub. Uti!., 333 Mass. 15, 127 N.E.2d 791 (1955), eminent domain power was 
held unnecessary to "public service corporation" status, for purposes of G.L. c. 40A, § 10. 
333 Mass. at 16-17, 127 N.E.2d at 793. 
5 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 893, 312 N.E.2d at 569. 
6 Id. at 892,312 N.E.2d at 568, quoting Goodwin v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 351 Mass. 
25, 27, 217 N.E.2d 782, 783 (1966). 
7 See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 224 Mass. 365,372, 113 N.E. 192, 195-96 
(1916); Weld v. Gas & Elec. Light Comm'rs, 197 Mass. 556,557,84 N.E. 101, 102 (1908). 
8 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 891, 312 N.E.2d at 568. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 892, 312 N.E.2d at 568. 
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concluded that such a common carrier of passengers by motor vehi-
cles, like a railroad, is a "public service corporation." 11 This conclusion 
essentially dismissed Truro's claims that the public service corporation 
must be "important," that its business must be "necessary and substan-
tial," and that it must possess some "right of eminent domain or other 
large privilege."12 The Court's response to these arguments was brief: 
"(T]he carrier service involved in this case could lawfully be provided 
by an individual or a partnership rather than a corporation. But the 
statute does not disqualify a small enterprise merely by virtue of its 
size."13 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision is logical and defensible. 
The General Court, however, may wish to consider whether it meant 
by section 10 of chapter 40A to exempt from local zoning regulations 
an operation of such small size and purely local importance as the 
carrier in the instant case. 14 
§16.15. Business use: Separation of storage from business. In 
Town of Fairhaven v. Ben Prince & Sons, Inc., 1 the town brought a bill 
in equity to compel compliance with the town's zoning by-laws. The 
defendant company used the locus, located in a business district, for 
the storage of old machinery and equipment. The company con-
tended that since it salvaged and sold parts from this equipment at its 
retail store, its use of the locus constituted a retail business permitted 
under the town's zoning by-law. 2 
After finding that the property in question was utilized as a junk-
yard, the superior court granted the injunctive relief requested by the 
town and reported the case to the Appeals Court. 3 Based upon the 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. The Court reaffirmed that "(o]ne purpose of G.L. c. 40A, § 10, is to ensure 'broad 
and balanced consideration of all aspects of the general public interest and welfare and not 
merely examination of the local and individual interests which might be affected.' "1974 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 892-93, 312 N.E.2d at 568, quoting New York Cent. R.R. v. Department of 
Pub. Util., 347 Mass. 586, 592, 199 N.E.2d 319, 324-25 (1964). 
14 The only indication in the Court's opinion that the sightseeing carrier in the present 
case had more than local importance is contained in the Court's statement that, while the 
carrier operated only within the town of Truro and the National Seashore, "it served tourists 
from afar." 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 893, 312 N.E.2d at 569. 
§16.15. 1 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 301,308 N.E.2d 917. 
2 The section of the town zoning by-laws applicable to business districts permitted, inter 
alia: retail stores; manufacturing which is "clearly incidental to a retail business lawfully 
conducted on the premises" and which is not "offensive, a nuisance or hazardous;" offices; 
banks; restaurants; theaters; filling stations; and "garages for storage.'' Id. at 302, 308 
N.E.2d at 917-18, quoting Fairhaven, Mass. Zoning By-laws§ 7. The Appeals Court sum-
marily dismissed the defendant's alternate contention that its use of the locus constituted 
"manufacturing clearly incidental to a retail business lawfully conducted on the premises," 
since the company's retail business was located about one-half mile from the locus. 1974 
Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 303, 308 N.E.2d at 918. 
3 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 301,308 N.E.2d at 917. 
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evidence, which "[gave] the impression that there [was] more junk 
than anything else on the premises,"4 the Appeals Court held that the 
defendant's use of the property was not a retail business permitted by 
the zoning by-laws.5 The court noted that "[u]ses of the kind found 
here have never been permitted by any zoning of the town in other 
than industrial districts."6 Thus, a final decree was ordered enjoining 
defendant from using the premises for the storage of junk or for the 
salvaging of parts from any of the same, and requiring the removal of 
all equipment and machinery already on the premises. 7 
§16.16. "Distribution plant": Definition. In Salah v. Board of Ap-
peals of Canton, 1 the Appeals Court defined the phrase "distribution 
plant" as used in a zoning by-law. 
The controversy arose when the defendant board denied approval 
of a site plan for the development of a parcel owned by plaintiff 
Salah. The plan provided for the erection of two buildings, surfacing 
of most of the remaining land, and leasing of the property to an in-
trastate common carrier. The principal building was to be used partly 
for warehousing, partly for office space, and partly as a "receiving 
and delivery terminal with extended loading dock facilities" and a 
railroad siding. 2 A smaller building was to be used as a maintenance 
garage for servicing the lessee intrastate carrier's vehicles. The 
plaintiff's property was located in an area designated for limited in-
dustrial uses by the local zoning ordinance. The uses allowed "as of 
right" in such a district included, inter alia, a "[w]arehouse or distribu-
tion plant for ... [certain enumerated products] or any products of 
manufacturing activities permitted by this paragraph (whether or not 
produced on the premises.)"3 The board denied approval of Salah's 
application on the grounds that the proposed use was not within the 
permissible uses of the zoning by-laws. 4 Based on a master's report, 
the superior court annulled the decision of the board and ordered the 
board to approve the site plan. 5 
The issue before the Appeals Court was whether the proposed use 
was a "distribution plant" as contemplated by the by-law. The board 
argued that the proposed facility-a trucking terminal operated by a 




§16.16. 1 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh.-, 314 N.E.2d 881. 
2 Id. at-, 314 N.E.2d at 882. 
3 Canton, Mass. Zoning By-law§ III E 1(h), quoted in 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at-, 
314 N.E.2d at 883. 
4 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at-, 314 N.E.2d at 882. 
5 Id. at-, 314 N.E.2d at 882. 
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common carrier-could not be characterized as a "distribution 
plant."6 The Appeals Court, however, refused to adopt such a restric-
tive meaning of the phrase. 7 Relying on Kreger v. Public Buildings 
Commissioner of Newton, 8 which indicated that a facility may be a "dis-
tribution plant" even if the operator does not own the goods being 
distributed, the court held that the phrase "distribution plant" fit the 
use proposed in the instant case. 9 The court found no problem with 
the fact that the operator was a common carrier. 10 
While upholding the superior court's decision to annul the decision 
of the board, the Appeals Court held that the trial court erred in or-
dering approval of the plaintiff's site plan and issuance of all neces-
sary permits, since the proposed commercial building was subject to 
additional conditions which neither the master, the trial court, nor the 
board had dealt with adequately.U Lacking any such determination as 
to whether the proposed use met the "general conditions for ap-
proval" imposed by the Canton by-law, the Court remanded the case 
to the board for further proceedings. 12 
Since the parties had argued the issue, and because the question 
would probably arise at a rehearing before the board, the court ruled 
on the permissibility, under the Canton by-law, of use of the smaller 
building as a maintenance garage. The court held, contrary to the 
board's contention, that the proposed maintenance garage was a per-
missible "accessory use" to the proposed distribution plant. 13 
Lastly, the court reversed the superior court's assessment of costs 
against the board, since the master's report relied upon by the trial 
judge did not support the conclusion, required by section 21 of chap-
ter 40A, that the board "acted with gross negligence, in bad faith, or 
with malice."14 The court stated that the finding that the site plan was 
denied "arbitrarily and capriciously" was not supported by the record 
or by any subsidiary findings, 15 but expressed no opinion as to 
whether this finding "in any way [met] the statutory standard."16 
6 Id. at-, 314 N.E.2d at 884. 
7 Id. at-, 314 N.E.2d at 884. 
8 353 Mass. 622, 234 N.E.2d 283 (1968). Kreger held that a facility consisting of oil storage 
tanks and loading and unloading bays for oil trucks could be characterized as a "distribution 
plant," even though the owner of the facility was not the owner of most of the oil distributed 
through the facility. Id. at 623, 234 N.E.2d at 284. 
9 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at-, 314 N.E.2d at 884. 
10 Id. at-, 314 N.E.2d at 884. 
11 Id. at-, 314 N.E.2d at 885. 
12 Id. at-, 314 N.E.2d at 885-86. 
13 Id. at-, 314 N.E.2d at 886. 
14 Id. at-, 314 N.E.2d at 886, quoting G.L. c. 40A, § 21, which governs the assessment of 
costs. 
15 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at-, 314 N.E.2d at 886-87. 
16 Id. at-n.12, 314 N.E.2d at 887 n.12. See text at note 14 supra. 
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§16.17. Errors in written decision: Correction by board of 
appeals. If a zoning board of appeals inadvertently makes a clerical 
mistake in the rendering of one of its decisions whereby the reported 
decision would be contrary to the very essence of the intended deci-
sion, a number of questions are raised. First of all, would the board 
have the authority to rectify the mistake without initiating a formal 
proceeding? Secondly, what effect would the procedural rules of sec-
tion 18g of chapter 40A have upon this situation? In Burwick v. Zoning 
Board of Appeals of Worcester,! the Appeals Court held that the board 
can correct its mistake without violating section 18 of the Zoning 
Enabling Act. 2 
The controversy involved in the present case can be traced back to 
December 29, 1970, when the city council of Worcester voted to 
amend its zoning ordinance in such a way as to place the locus in an 
RL-7 zoning district, in which certain types of multi-family dwellings 
are permitted if a special permit is obtained. Five months later all but 
one of the abutters brought an action in superior court challenging 
the validity of the amendment. While that matter was still in litigation, 
Burwick applied, under the provisions of the amended ordinance, to 
the board of appeals for a special permit to construct a series of 
multi-family apartment units. The board held a public hearing and 
voted unanimously to grant the special permit. No formal decision 
was rendered at that time, however, due to the pending litigation as 
to the validity of the amendment. The board signed a copy of the site 
plan and orally agreed on the specific conditions and safeguards 
which would be inserted in any formal decision which might later be 
issued. 
About a year later, the superior court issued a declaratory decree 
determining that the amendment was valid. Following that decision, 
the board's members signed a form of decision granting Burwick the 
special permit. A problem resulted because the decision set out condi-
tions and safeguards which differed materially from those which had 
previously been agreed upon. Realizing their mistake, all the members 
of the board signed another form of decision granting the special 
permit with conditions and safeguards which were consistent and sub-
stantially identical to those orally agreed upon by the board at the 
original hearing. 
The superior court found that the first form of decision was null 
and void, and that the latter decision was valid and in full force and 
effect. 3 The trial judge's reasoning was that the first form of decision 
was made "through mistake and error, in the mistaken and erroneous 
§16.17. 1 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 87,306 N.E.2d 455. 
2 Id. at 89-93, 306 N.E.2d at 457-59. 
3 Id. at 88-90, 306 N.E.2d at 456-57. 
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belief that [the board members] were signing what they had unam-
mously voted" at the formal hearing. 4 
The Appeals Court affirmed this ruling,5 stating that "(t]he board 
had the power, without holding a public hearing, to correct an inad-
vertent (and essentially clerical) error ... so that the record would re-
flect the true intention of the board."6 The court particularly noted 
that the subsequent, correcting form of decision was not an instance 
of a "reversal of a conscious decision"7 nor one in which a board pur-
ported to grant relief different from that originally sought and dis-
cussed at a public heat:ing. 8 
As to the further claims of the abutters concerning various viola-
tions of section 18 of chapter 40A9 the court appeared very hesitant 
to apply the statute to the letter since the abutters failed to show how 
they had been prejudiced by the board's failure to adhere strictly to 
the provisions of section 18.10 The court dismissed the claim that the 
board failed to adopt rules for conducting its business on the grounds 
that the evidence as to whether the board had adopted such rules was 
indecisive.U The abutters failed to specify what subjects should have 
been covered by such rules or how the existence of such rules would 
have benefited them. 12 Next, the court pointed out that precedent 
dictated that the provisions of section 18 requiring the board to make 
a decision within 60 days of the filing of the application for a special 
permit is directory rather than mandatory. 13 The court reiterated that 
the reason for the delay was the board's decision to await the outcome 
of the pending litigation which would determine whether a special 
permit could be issued.H Clearly the delay was not frivolous. Nor did 
the record offer any evidence that the abutters were adversely af-
fected by the delay. 
The Appeals Court then examined the merits of the claim that the 
'!d. 
5 Id. at 89, 94, 306 N.E.2d at 457, 459. 
6 Id. at 89, 306 N.E.2d at 457. 
7 Id., quoting Cassani v. Planning Bd. of Hull, 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 533,538,300 
N.E.2d 746, 750. 
8 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 89,306 N.E.2d at 457, distinguishing Potter v. Board of 
Appeals of Mansfield, 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 97, 102-03, 294 N.E.2d 587, 591. 
9 The abutters sought to invalidate the second form of decision on the grounds that the 
board had violated G.L. c. 40A, § 18 in failing: (1) to adopt rules for conducting its business; 
(2) to make a decision within 60 days of the filing of the application; (3) to make a detailed 
record of its proceedings, showing the vote of each member and setting forth the reasons for 
its decision; and (4) to file a copy of its decision in the office of the planning board within 
fourteen days of the decision. 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 89-90, 306 N.E.2d at 457. 
10 See 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 92, 306 N.E.2d at 459. 
11 Id. at 90, 306 N.E.2d at 457. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 I d. at 90-91, 306 N .E.2d at 458. 
26
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1974 [1974], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1974/iss1/19
372 1974 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §16.18 
board failed to make a detailed record of its proceedings. The court 
refused to accept the abutters' interpretation of section 18 as requir-
ing the board to preserve, or to file with the city clerk, copies of 
drafts of proposed findings or of a proposed decision. 15 All the rec-
ords were a matter of public record and were kept and maintained by 
the city clerk. 16 Outlining the breadth and detail of these records, the 
court concluded that section IS's record-keeping requirement had 
been satisfied. 17 
The final issue in the case involved an attempt to have the trial 
court's decision reversed because of failure of the applicant (Burwick) 
and the board to introduce any evidence in support of the merits of 
the board's decision, and because the trial court made no independent 
findings in this regard. The Appeals Court refused to consider the 
question because it had not been raised in either of the bills filed by 
the abutters. 18 Therefore, since it was not a jurisdictional issue, it 
could not be raised, as a matter of right, for the first time on 
appeaJ.l 9 
The Appeals Court's decision in Burwick seems to be influenced by 
the attempts of the abutters to have the court penalize Burwick for 
possible failures of the board over which he had no control and 
which, as a matter of substance, did not prejudice the abutters.20 
Nevertheless, it would seem that the entire controversy could have 
been avoided if the board had issued a tentative form of decision at 
the outset which would have become effective only if the pending 
litigation resulted in a favorable decision on the validity of the zoning 
ordinance amendment. 
§16.18. Zoning procedure: Appeals to Housing Court of the City 
of Boston. Chapter 669 of the Acts of 1974 is designed to extend 
the jurisdiction of the Boston Housing Court to appeals from zoning-
related decisions of the board of appeal which are "concerned with 
any building or place used, or intended or permitted for use, as a 
place of human habitation."1 The Act amends sections 11 and 12 of 
the Boston Zoning Enabling Act. 2 It should be noted that section 3 of 
the 1974 Act3 also amended section 3 of chapter 185A 4 of the General 
Laws, dealing with the jurisdiction of the housing court. 
15 Id. at 92, 306 N.E.2d at 458. 
16 Id. at 91, 306 N.E.2d at 458. 
17 Id. at 91-92, 306 N.E.2d at 458. 
18 Id. at 93-94, 306 N.E.2d at 459. 
19 Id. at 94, 306 N.E.2d at 459. 
20 See id. at 92-93, 306 N.E.2d at 459. 
§16.18. 1 Acts of 1974, c. 669, § l. 
2 Acts of 1956, c. 665, §§ 11,12. 
3 Acts of 1974, c. 669, § 3. 
4 G.L. c. 185A, § 3. 
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§16.19. Earth removal: Non-conforming use. In Byrne v. Town of 
Middleborough, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court was asked to consider the 
validity, as applied, of an earth removal by-law enacted by the town in 
1970 which prohibited the removal of earth from any lot in the town 
without a permit from the board of selectmen. 2 Plaintiffs operated six 
gravel pits in the town which were subject to the by-law. The by-law 
provided for the adoption of regulations by the board of selectmen to 
govern the permit application procedure. 3 Prior to the effective date 
of the by-law,4 the board of selectmen decided to continue certain 
"conditions" for the removal of soil, loam, sand, and gravel adopted 
under a previous by-law as "regulations" for the new by-law. These 
conditions provided that "the continued operation on the same parcel 
of an existing sand or gravel pit" was exempt from the permit 
requirement. 5 
Plaintiffs argued that their earth removal operations were non-
conforming uses and, therefore, were exempted by section 5 of chap-
ter 40A 6 from the effect of the new by-law 7 or, in the alternative, that 
if their operations were subject to the new by-law, the by-law was un-
constitutional since it denied due process of law in not providing for 
pre-existing uses." 8 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the first of these two argu-
ments by referring to the explicit language of section 5 of chapter 
40A,9 which provides that "a zoning ... by-law or any amendment 
thereof" shall not apply to an already existing use. 10 Since the earth 
removal by-law was adopted pursuant to section 21 ( 17) of chapter 
40, 11 and not pursuant to the Zoning Enabling Act, 12 it was held not 
to be a zoning by-law to which section 5 applied. 13 
The Court refused to reach the second argument advanced by the 
plaintiffs because the "conditions" which the board of selectmen 
§ 16.19. 1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1485,304 N.E.2d 194. The superior court reported the case 
to the Appeals Court without decision, and the case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial 
Court under G.L. c. 211A, § 10(A). 
2 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1486-87, 304 N .E.2d at 195-96. Small projects, town projects, and 
construction sites were not subject to the by-law. Id. 
3 Id. at 1486, 304 N.E.2d at 195. 
4 The effective date had been postponed until March 1, 1971 at the plaintiffs" request. I d. 
5 I d. at 1488, 304 N .E.2d at 196. 
6 See text at notes 9-10 infra. 
7 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1485, 304 N.E.2d at 195. 
8 ld. 
9 Id. at 1487-88, 304 N.E.2d at 196. 
10 G.L. c. 40A, § 5. 
11 G.L. c. 40, § 21(17) empowers a town to pass by-laws: "prohibiting or regulating the 
removal of soil, loam, sand or gravel from land not in public use in the whole or in specified 
districts of the town .... " 
12 G.L. c. 40A, §§ 1-22. 
13 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1488, 304 N.E.2d at 196. 
28
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1974 [1974], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1974/iss1/19
374 1974 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §16.20 
adopted to govern earth removal permits exempted existing sand or 
gravel pit operations from the permit requirement. 14 Since the board 
apparently intended to adhere to this exemption, and since the plain-
tiffs had withdrawn their applications for permits, 15 the Court held 
that no due process claim had been presented.16 In so holding, the 
Court refused to speculate whether the board, in subsequent proceed-
ings, would act in an unreasonable, whimsical or capricious manner in 
violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 17 The Court thus or-
dered a decree entered declaring that the earth removal by-law was 
not subject to the existing use requirements of section 5 of the Zoning 
Enabling Act and that, because of the regulations or "conditions" 
adopted by the local board of selectmen, the by-law did not deprive 
the plaintiffs of property without due process of law. 18 
B. SuBDIVISION CoNTROL 
§16.20. Plans not requiring planning board approval: Extent of 
zoning amendment protection. When a plan of development does 
not require approval under the Subdivision Control Law, 1 section 7A 
of chapter 40A provides the plan with a three-year immunity from 
any zoning amendments which would otherwise affect the proposed 
use of the land. 2 In Bellows Farms, Inc. v. Building Inspector of Acton, 3 
the Supreme Judicial Court traced the history of section 7 A in deter-
mining the extent of protection afforded by this section. The issue in-
volved in Bellows Farms was whether section 7 A provides broad im-
munity from any zoning amendments whatsoever or an immunity lim-
ited to only those amendments which would prohibit the proposed 
use altogether. 4 
In March, 1970 the plaintiffs submitted a plan of the locus to the 
town planning board and subsequently received an endorsement that 
"approval under the subdivision control law [was] not required."5 At 
that time the locus was zoned as a general business district and the 
applicable by-law permitted, as a matter of right, use of the land for 
the erection of up to 435 apartment units. The plaintiff planned to 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 1488-89, 304 N.E.2d at 196-97. 
16 Id. at 1488, 304 N.E.2d at 196. 
17 I d. at 1488-89, 304 N.E.2d at 196-97. 
18 Id. at 1489, 304 N.E.2d at 197. 
§16.20. 1 G.L. c. 41, §§ 81K-GG. See G.L. c. 41, § 81P. 
2 G.L. c. 40A, § 7 A (second paragraph). 
3 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1399, 303 N.E.2d 728. 
4 See id. at 1401-02, 303 N.E.2d at 730. 
5 ld. at 1399, 303 N.E.2d at 729. G.L. c. 41, § 81P authorizes such an endorsement on a 
plan which does not show a "subdivision," as defined in G.L. c. 41, § 81L. 
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construct 402 units. At its 1970 annual town meeting, held after the 
plaintiff's plans were submitted, the town adopted amendments with 
respect to: (a) off-street parking and loading requirements, and (b) 
the "Intensity Regulation Schedule" applicable to multiple dwelling 
units. At the 1971 town meeting, further amendments were adopted 
making the use of lands for multiple dwellings subject to a provision 
requiring prior approval of the "site plan" by the board of selectmen. 
If these amendments were to be applied to the plaintiff's plans, the 
net effect would be a reduction-from 435 to 203-in the number of 
apartments permitted on the locus. 
In its analysis of the history of section 7 A from 1957 to 1965, the 
Supreme Judicial Court noted that neither the original version (1957) 6 
nor its first amendment (1959)7 had any application to those plans not 
requiring approval under the Subdivision Control Law. 8 It was not 
until 1960 that section 7 A became applicable to plans not requiring 
planning board approval. The sentence added by chapter 291 of the 
Acts of 1960 provided: "No amendment to any zoning ordinance or 
by-law shall apply to or affect any lot shown on a plan previously en-
dorsed with the words 'approval under the subdivision control law not 
required' ... until a period of three years from the date of such en-
dorsement has elapsed .... "9 This sentence was removed by section 2 
of chapter 435 of the Acts of 1961, which further amended section 
7 A by (a) making certain revisions in the first paragraph, dealing with 
plans requiring planning board approval, and (b) eliminating entirely 
the above mentioned protection for plans not requiring planning board 
approval. 10 Protection for those plans "not requiring board approval" 
was restored by chapter 578 of the Acts of 1963, which provided: 
[T]he use of the land shown on such plan shall be governed by 
applicable provisions of the zoning ordinance or by-law in effect 
at the time of the submission of such plan . . . for a period of 
three years from the date of endorsement by the plannmg board 
that approval under the subdivision control law is not required 
11 
It is important to distinguish between the language used in the 
1960 and 1963 amendments. As the Court noted: "The use of the dif-
ferent language in the current statute indicates a legislative intent to 
grant a more limited survival of preamendment rights under 
6 Acts of 1957, c. 297. 
7 Acts of 1959, c. 221. 
8 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1402-03, 303 N.E.2d at 731. 
9 Acts of 1960, c. 291. 
10 Acts of 1961, c. 435, § 2. 
11 Acts of 1963, c. 578. The language of the 1963 amendment is that contained in the 
present second paragraph of G.L. c. 40A, § 7 A. 
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amended zoning ordinances and by-laws." 12 The Court emphasized 
that the 1960 statute provided broad, unrestricted protection from fu-
ture zoning amendments for "any lot" shown on a plan, while the 1963 
statute protects only "the use of the land" shown on a plan from sub-
sequent amendments. 13 
To further support this distinction, the Court, while admitting that 
they have no controlling effect, examined the titles of the 1960 and 
1963 statutes!4 The 1960 title was "An act exempting certain lots for 
which approval under the subdivision control law is not required from 
the effect of subsequent amendments to zoning ordinances and 
by-laws."15 The title of the 1963 statute was "An act limiting the exemp-
tion '![ lots shown on certain plans from the effect of zoning ordi-
nances or by-laws becoming effective after the submission of such 
plans to the planning board."16 The Court found the differences be-
tween the declared purposes "a persuasive factor in support of a con-
clusion that the legislature did not intend the 1963 statute to have the 
same effect as the 1960 statute."17 
The conclusion that section 7 A protects the plan for which planning 
board approval is not required only from amendments which would 
eliminate or reduce a use permitted under the zoning regulations in 
effect at the time of the submission of the plan18 led the Court to 
conclude that the town's amendments of 1970 and 1971 applied to 
plaintiffs plan! 9 Neither amendment, when applied to the locus, in-
fringed upon the reasonable use of the land for apartment purposes 
nor reduced or limited the "use of the land," notwithstanding the re-
duced number of units permitted under the by-law as amended. 20 
One may well wonder if any rational explanation exists for the dif-
fering zoning protection afforded by section 7 A to plans requiring 
approval and those not requiring approval under the Subdivision 
Control Law. 21 The history of the adoption of those various acts sug-
gests they were each designed to meet particular circumstances then 
involved in conflicts between communities and subdividers rather than 
being part of a logical and reasonable analysis of the extent of protec-
tion needed. The Court's interpretation of section 7 A seems fully cor-
rect, however, and constitutional arguments based upon equal protec-
tion concepts would surely fail. 
12 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1404, 303 N.E.2d at 731. 
13 Id., 303 N.E.2d at 731-32. 
14 Id. at 1404-05, 303 N.E.2d at 732. 
15 I d. at 1405, 303 N.E.2d at 732, quoting title to Acts of 1960, c. 291 (emphasis added by 
Court). 
16 Id., quoting title to Acts of 1963, c. 578 (emphasis added by Court). 
17 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1405, 303 N.E.2d at 732. 
18 Id. at 1404, 1406, 303 N.E.2d at 731-32, 733. 
19 Id. at 1408-09. 303 N.E.2d at 734. 
20 Id. at 1408, 303 N.E.2d at 733-34. 
21 Compare the first and second paragraphs of G.L. c. 40A, § 7A. 
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§16.21. Zoning changes: Protection of approved subdivision. 
Green v. Board of Appeal of Norwood 1 further clarifies the type of pro-
tection provided by section 7 A of chapter 40A for submitted 
plans requiring approval under the Subdivision Control Law. On the 
basis of the facts presented, the Appeals Court was faced with issues 
involving the tolling point of the statute, the effect of an official's in-
action, possibilities of a waiver of rights through a subsequent filing, 
the effects that a town's procedural requirements have on section 7 A, 
and the obligation upon the complainant to initiate actions forcing the 
building inspector to act. 
The plaintiffs owned a parcel of land in Norwood. A subdivision 
plan was filed in 1964 and was approved by the Norwood planning 
board on March 29, 1965. In 1968, building permits were issued for 
two multi-family units. These permits were subsequently revoked by 
the board of appeal, but the revocation was eventually annulled by the 
Supreme Judicial Court. 2 
The present controversy involved an application, made in January, 
1969, for a permit to build a third dwelling unit on the property. 
There was no immediate decision by the building inspector on this 
application. Instead, on March 5, 1971, at the building inspector's re-
quest, the plaintiffs modified their plan and filed a revised application 
conforming to changes in the Norwood building code. This applica-
tion was denied on March 15, and on May 26 plaintiffs requested that 
the building inspector act on their 1969 application. That application 
was denied on June 7. The board of appeal affirmed the building 
inspector's denial. 3 The superior court reversed, annulling the board's 
decision and ordering the board to issue the building permit.4 
Before the Appeals Court, the board argued that the trial judge was 
"plainly wrong" in finding that the plaintiffs filed the permanent ap-
plication for the third building in 1969.5 This time of filing was im-
portant because in 1965 Norwood's zoning by-law was amended to 
prohibit the construction of structures such as the one proposed in 
the plan. The protection provided under section 7 A, as then in effect, 
covered a period of only 5 years. 6 Therefore, if the 1971 application 
was deemed controlling, the plaintiffs would have no immunity from 
the amended by-law. 
In determining that the trial judge was not plainly wrong, the Ap-
§16.21. 1 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 687,313 N.E.2d 451. 
2 Green v. Board of Appeal of Norwood, 358 Mass. 253, 263 N.E.2d 423 (1970). 
3 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 687, 313 N.E.2d at 452. 
4 ld. 
5 Id. at 688, 313 N.E.2d at 453. 
• G.L. c. 40A, § 7 A (first paragraph), as amended by Acts of 1964, c. 688. The protection 
given submitted plans requiring approval under the Subdivision Control Law has since been 
extended to 7 years by Acts of 1965, c. 366, § l. 
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peals Court relied upon the testimony of plaintiffs' former attorney. 7 
The witness stated that "in January of 1969, he had personally deliv-
ered a permit application for [the third building], together with 
construction plans and a check for the permit fee, to the office of the 
building inspector and at that time had requested a building permit."8 
The Appeals Court also rejected the board's argument that even if 
the application was filed in 1969, the plaintiffs gained no rights under 
it, since section 7 A's five-year period of protection had expired before 
the building inspector acted on the application. 9 The court, emphasiz-
ing that "the purpose of § 7 A is to protect developers from zoning 
changes, albeit under particular circumstances and for a limited time 
as set forth in the statute,"10 concluded that the statute is tolled at the 
time the subdivision plan is filed, and that as long as the filing takes 
place within the specified time allowed, the developer is protected by 
section 7 A. 11 The court stressed that it would be inconsistent with the 
purpose of section 7 A to allow the protection afforded by section 7 A 
to be nullified by a local official's inaction: "What a town cannot ac-
complish with regard to subdivision plans by disapproval, it should 
not be allowed to achieve by inaction in the case of permit applica-
tions filed under such plans."12 
The Appeals Court also held that the filing of the revised applica-
tion in 1971 did not act as a waiver of rights under the 1969 applica-
tion because, in all material respects, the two applications were 
identical. 13 The 1971 application was retyped and redated at the re-
quest of and to accommodate the building inspector. 14 
The fact that the check submitted with the 1969 application was re-
turned to the plaintiffs did not indicate a waiver of rights to the Ap-
peals Court, since the building inspector had informed the plaintiffs' 
attorney that it was the procedural practice of the town to require ap-
plicants to pay the fee only when their application was "ready" to be 
approved,IS Clearly, such a procedure should not be allowed to frus-
trate the rights established by section 7 A. Had the plaintiffs not issued 
the check with the 1969 filing and if it were commonplace to do so, a 
question might be raised as to whether the filing was complete. How-
ever, such was not the case here. 
The final issue involved the question of whether the plaintiffs lost 
their section 7 A protection due to their failure to seek a writ of man-
7 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 689, 313 N.E.2d at 453. 
BJd. 
9 Id. at 689-90, 313 N.E.2d at 453-54. 
10 Id. at 689-90, 313 N.E.2d at 453. 
11 Id. at 690, 313 N.E.2d at 454. 
12 Id. 
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damus to force the building inspector to act on their 1969 application. 
This was the procedure deemed proper by the Supreme Judicial 
Court in Ouellette v. Building Inspector of Quincy. 16 Ouellette was distin-
guished on the grounds that no· purpose would have been served in 
the instant case by a petition for mandamus. 17 The plaintiffs already 
had litigation pending on prior applications for permits18 and the end 
result would have been a duplication of the appeal then pending.19 
Although the court concluded that the board acted erroneously in 
refusing to give the protection of section 7 A to the plaintiffs' permit 
application, it nevertheless held that the trial court was incorrect in 
ordering the board to grant the building permit. 20 A determination 
was first necessary as to whether the application complied with the 
zoning by-laws in effect at the time the subdivision plan was first 
submitted in 1964.21 
§ 16.22. Access to adjoining road: Requirements of planning 
board regulation. In order to protect the public safety, convenience, 
and welfare, one of the requirements of section 81M of chapter 41 is 
adequate access to a subdivision. 1 To further supplement this statu-
tory obligation, the town of Winchester adopted regulation IV A (1) 
(c), which requires that "[s]treets shall be continuous and in alignment 
with existing streets as far as practicable and shall comprise a conven-
ient system with connections adequate to insure free circulation of 
vehicular traffic."2 In McDavitt v. Planning Board of Winchester, 3 the 
plaintiff argued that this regulation should be interpreted so as to as-
sure only the continuity of travel within a subdivision. 4 
The plaintiff was in the process of subdividing a thirteen-and-one-
half acre tract. The planning board had approved the subdivision of 
three-quarters of the tract into nine lots, and the controversy in this 
case involved the remaining parcel of land. The plaintiff's proposed 
plan for this parcel was rejected by the planning board because it had 
provided for a street to dead-end in the subdivision, thereby violating 
regulation IV A (1) (c) as interpreted by the planning board.5 The 
16 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1369, 1373-74, 285 N.E.2d 423,426-27. 
17 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at691, 313 N.E.2d at454. For a discussion ofthis case, see 
Huber, Land Use Law, 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§ 22.3, at 620-22. 
18 See text at note 2 supra. 
19 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 691, 313 N.E.2d at 454. 
2o Id. 
2t Id. 
§16.22. I G.L. c. 41, § 81M. 
2 Winchester, Mass. Planning Board Regulation IV A (1) (c), quoted in McDavitt v. 
PlanningBd. ofWinchester, 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 318,318-19, 308N.E.2d 786,787. 
3 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 318, 308 N.E.2d 786. 
4 Id. at 319, 308 N.E.2d at 787. 
5 Id. at 318-19, 308 N.E.2d at 787. 
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primary reason for this suit in superior court was that extending the 
dead-end street to join a street in the adjoining subdivision would 
have resulted in a sacrifice of one of the three lots in the proposed 
subdivision plan. 
The board's decision was upheld by the superior court6 and the 
Appeals Court affirmed. 7 In its decision, the Appeals Court con-
cluded that the planning board's regulation was "reasonably related to 
public safety, health, welfare and convenience, and complies with the 
purposes of the subdivision controllaw."8 Another basis of the court's 
rejection of plaintiffs narrow interpretation of the regulation was the 
precedent established by the board when it previously required the 
abutting subdivider to extend its road to the common boundary. The 
court noted that plaintiff, because of the board's action on the prior 
subdivision approval of the subdivider's land, should have known that 
conformity of this nature was established in previous cases and there 
was no basis to expect a waiver of this regulation. 9 
This case is representative of a fundamental subdivision control 
problem. Since the planning board had established its policy by 
proper (if a trifle confusing) regulation, and since the policy con-
formed to the purposes of the subdivision control law, the result was 
to be anticipated and was proper. 
C. EMINENT DoMAIN 
§16.23. Damages: Sales price of comparable property. The Ap-
peals Court in Corliss Realty Co. v. Commonwealth 1 was faced with cer-
tain evidentiary problems arising from an eminent domain proceed-
ing. In 1967 the Commonwealth took by eminent domain a portion of 
Corliss's land. Corliss brought a petition for assessment of damages 
caused by the taking. In the petition Corliss alleged that the taking 
would curtail the operation of two quarries located on the remaining 
portion of its land. The two quarries, containing "Milford Pink Gran-
ite," were identified as the Dodd Quarry, which was active at the time 
of the taking, and the Norcross Quarry, which had not been operated 
at least since 1930. 
The Commonwealth called a witness who testified that in 1963 he 
had bought a similar quarry (the Maguire Quarry) for $10,000, with 
the seller retaining the right to take whatever loose stone was then on 
the premises. Corliss claimed that the trial judge erred in permitting 
6 Id. at 318, 308 N.E.2d at 787. 
7 Id. at 319, 308 N.E.2d at 788. 
8 Id., 308 N.E.2d at 787. 
9 Id., 308 N.E.2d at 788. 
§16.23. 1 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 45, 306 N.E.2d 460. 
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the witness to testify to the purchase price of the Maguire Quarry be-
cause it was not comparable to the Norcross or Dodd quarries and be-
cause the price was not sufficiently definite. 2 The Appeals Court held 
that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the 
evidence.3 The court found that the similarities between the quarries 
were sufficient to enable the trial judge to conclude that evidence of 
the sales price might be helpful to the jury.4 
In addressing itself to the petitioner's claim that the sales price of 
the Maguire property was not sufficiently definite, the court first 
commented that had the petitioner so requested, it might have been a 
"wise exercise of discretion"5 to exclude the testimony concerning 
loose stone in the Maguire Quarry, which was personalty and not part 
of the real estate being sold. The court viewed this testimony as possi-
bly confusing, but upheld the trial court's judgment that the lack of 
any encumbrances in the deed to the Maguire property indicated that 
the $10,000 cash paid for the quarry was the sale price and that any 
loose stone (as personalty) was irrelevant in determining the value of 
the realty. 6 
The petitioner's final exception related to the exclusion of its at-
tempt to elicit from the buyer of the Maguire Quarry an opinion as to 
whether the Maguire Quarry was comparable to the Dodd Quarry. In 
overruling the exception, the Appeals Court noted that the petitioner, 
on cross-examination, was permitted to ask the buyer about various 
differences between the two quarries. 7 The court indicated that it was 
"much better to have the witness describe the two estates than to 
permit him to express his opinion on their ... similarity."8 Thus the 
court upheld all the evidentiary rulings of the trial court.9 
The trial judge in eminent domain cases has great discretion in ac-
cepting or rejecting evidence of the value of property taken. Certainly 
the acceptance of the sales price of the Maguire Quarry was within 
that discretion, even though the sale had occurred in 1963. There was 
no evidence, so far as can be judged, that the value of such types of 
property had fluctuated in the intervening period. 
§16.24. Partial taking: "Substantial portion" lease clause. In 
Saugus Auto Theatre Corp. v. Munroe Realty Corp., 1 the Appeals 
Court interpreted the term "substantial portion" as used in a commer-
• Id. at 46, 306 N.E.2d at 461. 
3Jd. 
'I d. 
5 Id. at 47, 306 N.E.2d at 462. 
6 Id., 306 N.E.2d at 461-62. 
7 Id. at 48, 306 N.E.2d at 462. 
s Id., quoting Lyman v. City of Boston, 164 Mass. 99, 104, 41 N.E.127, 128 (1895). 
9 Id. at 48, 306 N.E.2d at 462. 
§16.24. 1 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 157, 306 N.E.2d 463. 
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cial lease provision governing the landlord's right to evict the tenant 
when a portion of the premises are taken by eminent domain. The 
plaintiff, assignee of a twenty-five year commercial lease, sought a dec-
laration that it was entitled to continue in possession of the leased 
premises-a drive-in theater. The defendant realty company relied 
upon a lease provision which provided, in substance, that if the "pre-
mises or any substantial portion thereof [were] taken by public author-
ity," the lessors would be entitled to take immediate possession and 
terminate the lease. 2 The trial court found that 2.15 acres belonging 
to the defendant, most of which was from the 13 acres subject to the 
lease, were taken by the Commonwealth in 1970, but ruled that the 
taking did not substantially affect the capacity or operation of. the 
theater on the remaining eleven acres. 3 Thus, the trial court entered a 
decree for the plaintiffs because the taking was not substantial within 
the meaning of the lease. 4 Munroe, seeking to terminate the lease, 
appealed. 
The Appeals Court, in a rescript opinion, first noted that the clause 
in question is commonly used in leases to allow the landlord to de-
prive the tenant of an opportunity to share in any damages awarded 
in an eminent domain proceeding. 5 Thus the clause creates rights the 
landlord would not enjoy if the clause were not included. 6 Noting that 
"substantial" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary to mean "of real 
worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable," 7 and indicat-
ing that the "substantial portion" clause must be construed in light of 
its purpose,8 the court held that the taking of fifteen per cent of the 
premises was "substantial" as that term was used in the lease. 9 
§16.25. New relocation benefits law. Chapter 863 of the Acts of 
1973 increased state relocation benefits so that the law in Mas-
sachusetts will be in conformance with the federal Uniform Relocation 
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970.1 Chap-
ter 863 amended sections 1-7, 11 and 12 of chapter 79A of the Gen-
eral Laws and added three additional sections. While this amendment 





6 Id., 306 N.E.2d at 464. See Van Dusen Aircraft Supplies of New England, Inc. v. 
Massachusetts Port Auth., 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 261, 266, 279 N.E.2d 717, 722 (taking by 
eminent domain of a portion of leased premises does not terminate a lease unless there is an 
eviction). 
7 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 157, 306 N.E.2d at 464. 
8 Id. 
9 ld. 
§16.25. I 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601, 4602, 4621-38, 4651-55 (1970). 
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since minor differences do exist. For example, new section 7(I)(A)(l) 
of chapter 79A requires actual documentation of reasonable expenses 
incurred in moving,2 while the federal statute does not require this 
higher standard of documentation. 3 In addition, while new section 
7(III)(A) of chapter 79A provides for payments to the displaced per-
son for "any increase in cost" required to lease or rent a dwelling 
place,4 the counterpart federal provision provides for payment of "the 
amount necessary" to enable such person to lease or rent a dwelling 
place.5 This difference can only lead one to assume that the Mas-
sachusetts law, unlike the federal law, expects the displaced person to 
be responsible for that part of the rent at his new residence which is 
not in excess of that which he was previously paying. 
§16.26. Boundaries: Taking of street easement. The case of 
Smith v. Hadad 1 presented the Appeals Court and Supreme Judicial 
Court with the opportunity to restate an accepted rule of construction 
in establishing boundaries when the property abuts a public way. The 
controversy arose when Smith petitioned the land court to register 
and confirm the title to his land. Smith and Hadad owned adjoining 
parcels, with Hadad's property also fronting on a public way sixty-six 
feet in width. The deeds of both Smith and Hadad described the 
boundary between their property as a line "running Southerly and 
parallel to Main Street and distant one hundred seventyfive (17 5) feet 
therefrom .... "2 The central issue in this case was whether the 175-foot 
measurement began at the western edge or at the center of Main 
Street. Since Main Street is sixty-six feet wide, the resolution of this 
question would affect title to a thirty-three foot parcel claimed by both 
petitioners and respondents. 
The land court ordered the registration as applied for by Smith ex-
cept for the thirty-three foot strip in question. 3 In affirming the land 
court's decision,4 the Appeals Court followed the rule of construction 
set forth in Dodd v. Witt.· 5 
[I]t is a common method of measurement in the country, where 
the boundary is a stream or way, to measure from the bank of the 
stream or the side of the way; and ... there is a reasonable pre-
sumption that the measurements were made in this way, unless 
2 G.L. c. 79A, § 7(I)(A)(l), as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 863, § 7. 
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a)(1) (1970). 
4 G.L. c. 79A, § 7(III)(A), as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 863, § 7. 
5 42 U .S.C. § 4624(1) (1970). 
§16.26. 1 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 755,305 N.E.2d 515, affd,1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1287, 314 N.E.2d 435. 
2 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 756, 305 N.E.2d at 516. 
3 Id. at 755, 305 N.E.2d at 516. 
4 Id. at 759, 305 N.E.2d at 518. 
5 139 Mass. 63, 29 N.E. 475 (1885). 
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something appears affirmatively in the deed to show that they 
began at the center line of the stream or way. 6 
The Appeals Court expressly rejected Smith's argument seeking to 
distinguish Dodd on the ground that evidence that measurements were 
actually made must be introduced before the presumption can be 
invoked. 7 Smith's application to obtain further appellate review was 
granted and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the 
Appeals Court. 8 
The Supreme Judicial Court's opinion adds little more than weight 
to the Appeals Court decision. The Court refused to overturn the es-
tablished rule of construction set forth in Dodd, noting that abandon-
ment of the presumption would create chaos in titles to land and 
would result in substantial hardships to property owners.9 
D. OTHER LAND UsE MATTERS 
§16.27. Mobile home parks: Regulation. In November 1973, the 
General Court dealt with the problem of mobile home parks by enact-
ing chapter 1007 of the Acts of 1973, which amended sections 32J 
and 32L of chapter 140 of the General Laws, 1 and added sections 
32M through 32Q to the same chapter. 2 
Subject to certain conditions and restrictions, new section 32J per-
mits a mobile home park operator to recover possession of mobile 
home space from a tenant by summary process. 3 The only reasons for 
which a tenancy or other estate may be terminated under this section 
are (1) "nonpayment of rent," (2) "substantial violation of any en-
forceable rule of the mobile home park" or (3) "violation of any laws 
or ordinances which protect the health or safety of other mobile home 
park residents."4 In order to maintain an action to recover possession, 
the mobile home park operator must give the resident at least thirty 
days written notice in which the resident is informed of the reasons 
for termination and notified that he has fifteen days from the date of 
mailing to avoid eviction by tendering past due rent or taking other 
curative steps. 5 After such notice is given, an operator is still pre-
6 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 758,305 N.E.2d at517, quoting Dodd v. Witt, 139 Mass. 
at 65-66, 29 N.E. at 476 (emphasis added by court). 
7 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 759, 305 N.E.2d at 517. 
8 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1287,314 N.E.2d at 436. 
9 Id. at 1290, 314 N.E.2d at 438. 
§16.27. 1 Acts of 1973, c. 1007, §§ 1,2. 
2 ld. § 2. 
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eluded from maintaining an action unless the condition necessitating 
the notice remains uncured more than twenty days after receipt of the 
notice by the mobile home park resident. 6 The final procedural pre-
requisite in the new section is that an action to recover possession, 
other than for nonpayment of rent, may be maintained only if it is 
brought within thirty days of the last alleged violation. 7 If, however, 
the same "substantial violation" recurs within six months of the date 
on which the notice was delivered to the resident, the mobile home 
park operator may maintain his action. 8 New section 32L places six 
specific requirements and restrictions upon all mobile home parks. 
The first of these requirements is that a mobile home park operator 
may promulgate rules governing the rental of a mobile home lot 
which are not unreasonable, unfair, or unconscionable. 9 Secondly, this 
section requires that if any rule or change in rent does not apply uni-
formly to all residents of a similar class, a rebuttable presumption will 
be created that the rule or change in rent is unfair.10 The third re-
striction prohibits an operator who is engaged in the business of selling 
mobile homes and who has "sold a number of mobile homes equal to 
the number of spaces in a mobile home park"11 from imposing condi-
tions of occupancy which restrict the resident in his choice of mobile 
home dealer or in his choice of fuel, furnishings, services, or acces-
sories, unless such restrictions are necessary for health or safety 
reasons. 12 This subsection permits central fuel distribution provided 
the rates charged by the operator do not exceed the local prevailing 
price for fuel and related services. 13 The fourth restriction prohibits 
the operator from refusing to allow the transfer of a mobile home lo-
cated in the park on the grounds that the operator has not sold a 
number of mobile homes equal to the number of spaces in the par-
ticular park.14 The fifth restriction provides that the operator may not 
restrict the sale of a mobile home located in the park by charging a 
fee or commission on such sale. 15 The operator may, however, act as a 
sales agent for a mobile home resident, and may charge a fee of not 
more than ten per cent of the sale price. 16 The final restriction re-
quires a mobile home park operator to give forty-five days written 




9 G.L. c. 140, § 32L(l). 
10 Id. § 32L(2). 
II Id. § 32L(3). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 ld. § 32L(3A). 
15 Id. § 32L(4). 
16 Id. 
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ing occupancy. 17 The operator must also file copies of any changes in 
rules with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Communities 
and Development at least forty-five days prior to the effective date of 
the change. 18 The final two subsections of section 32L make any non-
conforming, unfair, or deceptive rule or condition of occupancy 
unenforceable, 19 and give mobile home occupants a remedy by mak-
ing failure to comply with this section an unfair and deceptive trade 
practice20 under the Commonwealth's Consumer Protection Act. 21 
New section 32M prohibits the operator of a mobile home park 
from refusing entrance to the purchaser of a mobile home located in 
the park if the purchaser meets the rules of the park. 22 A violation of 
this section is also made an unfair and deceptive trade practice under 
section 2(a) of chapter 93A. 23 
In section 32N the General Court provided a statutory remedy for 
mobile home park residents who are subject to retaliatory evictions or 
other reprisals for their actions in reporting building or health code 
violations or violations of sections 32L or 32M.24 An occupant's re-
ceipt of a notice of termination of tenancy, other than for non-
payment of rent, within six months of the occupant's reporting a vio-
lation to an appropriate official creates a rebuttable presumption that 
the eviction is retaliatory and the presumption may be pleaded as a 
defense to any eviction proceeding brought within one year after the 
report of the violation. 25 The damages for an attempted retaliatory 
eviction or other actual or threatened reprisal are the mobile home 
resident's actual damages or not less than one nor more than five 
months rent, whichever is greater, plus reasonable costs and attorney's 
fees. 26 
Section 320 merely instructs court clerks to give notice to the attor-
ney general and the board of health in the city or town in which the 
mobile home park is located of any judgment, decree, permanent in-
junction, or other court order entered in any action to enforce the 
provisions of section 32L or section 32M.27 
Section 32P compels disclosure in writing of all terms and condi-
tions of a tenancy in a mobile home park to a prospective resident 
prior to the rental or occupancy. 28 The disclosure must include the 
I 7 I d. § 32L(5 ). 
18 ld. 
19 Id. § 32L(6). 
20 ld. § 32L(7). 
21 G.L. c. 93A, §§ 1-11. See especially G.L. c. 93A, § 2(a). 
22 G.L. c. 140, §32M. 
23 ld. 
24 Id. § 32N. 
2s Id. 
26 ld. 
27 ld. § 320. 
28 ld. § 32P. 
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amount of rent, an itemized list of charges and fees, the names and 
addresses of the owners of the mobile home park, and a copy of the 
rules. 29 A statutory notice informing the prospective tenants of their 
rights and remedies under sections 32J, 32L, 32M and 32N of chapter 
140 must also be given to prospective occupants.30 
Section 32Q defines "mobile home" in the same language previously 
found in section 32L. It provides that a mobile home is a "dwelling 
unit built on a chassis and containing complete electrical, plumbing 
and sanitary facilities, and designed to be installed on a temporary or 
a permanent foundation for permanent living quarters."31 
Section 3 of chapter 1007 amended section SA of chapter 239 to in-
clude occupants of mobile home parks in the classes of tenants per-
mitted to withhold rent when the rented premises are in violation of 
standards of fitness for human habitation. 32 
§ 16.28. Demolition and clearance of low rent housing 
projects. Chapter 884 of the Acts of I 973 is an .emergency law 
which authorized housing authorities to undertake the demolition, 
clearance, preparation for sale, and sale or other disposition of any or 
all of any existing, state-assisted housing project, including the pay-
ment of relocation costs for occupants of such housing projects. 1 Sec-
tion 1 of the Act added section 26(k) to chapter 121 B of the General 
Laws. 
Demolition and clearance of low-rent housing projects would take 
place only if specific conditions outlined in the Act are met. First, the 
Department of Community Affairs must find that a substantial por-
tion of the existing facility no longer provides "decent, safe and sani-
tary housing," as determined by the Department of Public Health or 
the Department of Public Safety. 2 The Department of Community Af-
fairs must also find that it would not be feasible to continue to oper-
ate or renovate the facility. 3 Second, if the Department of Community 
Affairs approves the demolition, including a relocation plan for the 
occupants of the existing structures and a plan to re-utilize the site for 
housing, the new housing must have at least twenty-five per cent of 
the units reserved for low income families. 4 The third proviso stipu-
lates that if the land is to be sold, it will be at the fair market value for 




' Id. § 32Q. 
32 Acts of 1973, c. I 007, § 3, amending G.L. c. 239, § 8A. 
§16.28. 1 Acts of 1973, c. 884, §I, amending G.L. c. 121B, § 26. 
2 G.L. c. 121 B, § 26(k)(l), added by Acts of 1973, c. 884, § I. 
3 Id. 
4 G.L. c. 121 B, § 26(k)(2), added by Acts of 1973, c. 884, § I. 
5 G.L. c. 121B, § 26(k)(3), added by Acts of 1973, c. 884, § I. 
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dures for funding which are dependent upon a cooperation agree-
ment between the Department of Community Affairs and the Mas-
sachusetts Housing Finance Agency. 6 The final provision requires that 
representatives of the affected tenants participate in the development 
of the project proposal and that a public hearing be held in order to 
give the remaining tenants an opportunity to review the proposed 
project and relocation plan and to voice any opinions which they 
might have. 7 
Section 2 of the Act amends chapter 121 B of the General Laws by 
adding new section 34A. 8 This section establishes procedures for con-
tracts between the Department of Community Affairs and a housing 
authority for state financial assistance in the form of annual contribu-
tions to assist projects financed by the MHF A which are leased by the 
housing authority as replacement or relocation housing for tenants of 
housing projects which are demolished, sold or otherwise disposed 
of.9 Section 4 of the Act establishes an upper limit of ten million dol-
lars that the Department of Community Affairs can spend for the 
purpose of such contracts,l 0 and section 5 authorizes the state treas-
urer to borrow on the credit of the Commonwealth in order to meet 
the payments authorized by section 4Y Final maturity on notes, 
whether original or renewal, issued for this purpose is to be no later 
than June 13, 1978. 12 Section 6 gives the state treasurer, upon request 
by the Governor, the power to issue and sell bonds of the Common-
wealth in order to meet expenditures necessary in carrying out the 
provisions of section 4 or to refinance notes.ta 
§ 16.29. Gardens on public land: Allocation. Chapter 654 of the 
Acts of 197 4 is an emergency law establishing a division of agricul-
tural land use within the Department of Agriculture. 1 Its primary 
purpose is to establish a system that will allow the utilization of avail-
able vacant public land for garden or farm purposes. 2 Priority in the 
allotment of vacant public land for garden purposes is given to elderly 
persons of low income and low income families with children between 
the ages of seven and sixteen inclusive. 3 The Act also stipulates that 
6 G.L. c. 121B, §§ 26(k)(4), (5) added by Acts of 1973, c. 884, § 1. 
7 G.L. c. 121B, § 26(k)(6), added by Acts of 1973, c. 884, § 1. 
8 Acts of 1973, c. 884, § 2. 
9 G.L. c. 121 B, § 34A, added by Acts of 1973, c. 884, § 2. Acts of 1973, c. 884, § 3 grants 
housing authorities the power to lease dwelling units financed by the MHF A, for a period 
not to exceed 40 years, for the purpose of providing replacement or relocation housing. 
10 Acts of 1973, c. 884, § 4. 
II Id. § 5. 
,. Id. 
13 Id. § 6. 
§16.29. 1 See Acts of 1974, c. 654, § 1, amending G.L. c. 20, § 6. 
2 Acts of 1974, c. 654, § 2, adding G.L. c. 20, § 14. 
3 Acts of 1974, c. 654, § 2, adding G.L. c. 20, § 15. 
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the "[p]roducts grown in gardens shall not be sold."4 
While the thrust and intent of this bill is most admirable, it can be 
questioned whether there exists sufficient vacant public land to satisfy 
the potential demand of qualifying individuals. The Act does open 
the possibility of utilizing privately-owned land,5 but this would be en-
tirely voluntary. 
STUDENT CoMMENT 
§ 16.30. Public right of passage along the coast: Opinion of the 
Justices to the House of Representatives. 1 In an advisory opinion to 
the Massachusetts House of Representatives, the Supreme Judicial 
Court expressed its belief that a proposed bill authorizing the public 
right of passage along privately-owned coastline of the Common-
wealth would be unconstitutional if enacted as submitted. 2 The Court 
considered and rejected three possible bases for upholding the bill, 
holding that there is no reserved public right of passage between the 
mean high water line and the extreme low water line, and that the 
measure could not be upheld as a proper exercise of either the state's 
police power or its power of eminent domain. 3 
In this casenote, the bases for the decision will be examined in light 
of both Massachusetts law and recent decisions in other jurisdictions 
in which a public right of passage was found to exist. It will be sub-
mitted that the Court correctly found the bill unconstitutional as writ-
ten, since it would constitute a taking of private property without 
compensation, and that the high cost of compensating land owners, as 
would be necessary to render such a bill constitutional, makes passage 
of such a law unlikely. 
4 Id. 
5 Acts of 1974, c. 654, § 2, adding G.L. c. 20, § 17. 
§16.30. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1067,313 N.E.2d 561. 
2 Id. at 1080, 313 N.E.2d at 571. The proposed bill, Mass. H.R. Doc. No. 481 (1974), 
which would have amended G.L. c. 91 by adding a new section, § 18B, provided in 
part: 
It is hereby declared and affirmed that the reserved interests of the public in the 
land along the coastline of the commonwealth include and protect a public on-foot 
free right-of-passage along the shore of the coastline between the mean high water 
line and the extreme low water line subject to the restrictions and limitations as 
contained in this section. 
Said public on-foot free right-of-passage shall not be exercised (I) later than 
one-half hour after sunset nor earlier than sunrise (2) where the Commissioner of 
the Department of Natural Resources ... designates and posts natural areas of 
critical ecological significance as areas in which ... the public not exercise the on-
foot free right-of-passage (3) where there exists a structure, enclosure or other im-
provements made or allowed pursuant to any law or any license, permit or other 
authority issued or granted under the General Laws or where there exist agricul-
tural fences .... 
3 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1073-80, 313 N.E.2d at 567-71. 
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I. Pusuc UsE WITHOUT CoMPENSATING PRIVATE OwNERS 
"Public trust" doctrine. Historically, title to the seas and all the lands 
beyond the high water mark within the jurisdiction of England was 
held by the King for the use of the public for navigation, commerce and 
fishing. 4 The rights to these lands in the United States vest-
ed in the individual states after the American Revolution. 5 Under the 
common law rule, any grant of shore land by a state to an individual 
normally gave the owner title only to land up to the high water 
mark,6 and a conveyance of land beyond that point by the state re-
mained subject to public rights. 7 The operation of this "public trust" 
doctrine was well demonstrated by the United States Supreme Court 
in 1892 in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 8 which involved a con-
troversy over the rights of the state of Illinois, the city of Chicago, 
and the Illinois Central Railroad Company in submerged and re-
claimed land adjoining Lake Michigan. The Illinois legislature had 
granted the submerged land to the railroad, but later repealed the 
grant to restore title to the state. In holding that the repealer was ef-
fective, the Court stated: 
The control of the State for the purpose of the trust can never be 
lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the in-
terests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any 
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and wa-
ters remaining.9 
The Court also declared that tidal land impressed with the public 
trust could validly be granted to private parties to build wharves, docks 
and piers, since the public interest in navigation would thereby be 
promoted. 10 
It has long been settled, however, that the common law rule was 
changed in Massachusetts in the 1640's by what is known as the Colo-
nial Ordinance of 1641-47,11 which, in an attempt to improve naviga-
tion by encouraging the development of private means of access to 
the sea, 12 provided that grants of tidal land by the state would give 
4 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, ll (1893). 
• Id. at 14-15. 
6 Id. at 13. 
7 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
8 146 u.s. 387 (1892). 
9 Id. at 453. 
10 Id. at 452. 
11 The ordinance has statutory effect. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 
Cush.) 53, 66-81 (1851). 
12 Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 257, 173 N.E.2d 
273, 277 (1961). 
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the owners title all the way to the low water mark. 13 The relationship 
between private ownership and public rights along the shore thus 
took on a different character in Massachusetts than in other states. 
Traditionally, these public rights included only fishing, commerce, 
and navigation.14 The Supreme Judicial Court, unlike other jurisdic-
tions discussed below, 15 refused in Opinion of the Justices to expand 
these rights to include recreation. 16 However, one might contend that 
the combination of the facts that the land is no longer used by most 
owners to promote navigation and that the modern interests of the 
public in the shore land are being impaired could justify legislation to 
protect the public's interest in the land in accordance with an ex-
panded public trust doctrine. 
The proposed statute appears to be based on the House's assertion 
that the reserved interests of the public in the coastal lands include 
the right to pass on foot between the high and low water marks. The 
Supreme Judicial Court, however, found that no such right has ever 
been recognized in Massachusetts, citing various cases. 17 In 1857 in 
Commonwealth v. Alger, 18 a leading case construing the meaning of the 
Colonial Ordinance, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the Ordi-
nance had consistently been construed as giving owners of tidal lands 
title in fee all the way to the low water mark, subject to the public 
right of navigation. 19 In 1907 in Butler v. Attorney General, 20 the Court 
determined that under the Colonial Ordinance there was no recogni-
tion of a public right to use the beach or shore above the low water 
mark for bathing purposes, 21 and in 1961 in Michaelson v. Silver Beach 
Improvement Association, 22 the Court stated that the only public rights in 
these lands that the state may protect are navigation and fishing. 23 It 
therefore is apparent that under existing Massachusetts case law, the 
13 Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 69-70 (1851). The change in the 
common law rule made by the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance was recognized by the 
United States Supreme Court. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18 (1893). 
14 See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892); 1 R. Clark, Waters and 
Water Rights § 36.4(B), at 201 (1967). 
15 See text at notes 32-54 infra. 
16 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1074,313 N.E.2d at 567. 
17 Id. at 1073-74,313 N.E.2d at 567, citing Butler v. Attorney Gen., 195 Mass. 79, 80 
N.E. 688 (1907); Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 173 
N.E.2d 273 (1961). 
18 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851). 
19 Id. at 69-70. 
20 195 Mass. 79, 80 N.E. 688 (1907). 
21 Id. at 83, 80 N.E. at 689. 
22 342 Mass. 251, 173 N.E.2d 273 (1961). 
23 I d. at 256, 173 N .E.2d at 277. It was claimed that a beach had been created for 
public use incidental to a project in aid of navigation. The Court said, though, that the 
colonial ordinance could not be frustrated by a project having only a colorable relation 
to navigation or fishing, and that no power to build beaches for public bathing pur-
poses is recognized. Id. at 256-57, 173 N.E.2d at 277. 
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Court was correct in finding that an on-foot right of passage is not 
one of the public's reserved rights in tidal lands. 
The Court's finding assumes, however, that the public rights in 
these lands was fixed for all time by the Colonial Ordinance and past 
decisions interpreting it. The Court rejected the idea that the rights of 
the public in these lands should not be limited to navigation and fish-
ing, but should include all significant public uses in the seashore. 24 
The Court interpreted the Ordinance as protecting certain well-
defined public rights to the exclusion of all others.25 It is worthwhile, 
though, to look at the purpose of the Ordinance; although it was de-
signed to encourage the development of private means of access to 
the sea,26 it is apparent that the colonial government did not wish to 
accomplish this at the expense of other rights since it provided that 
such grants were subject to the restriction that the owner could not 
hinder navigation and fishingP However, the uses to which the sea 
and underlying lands are put have changed considerably since the 
1640's. As one commentator has noted: 
Fishing and passage over the shore were probably the uses for 
which there was the greatest public demand and serious need at 
the time when the question of public rights was being determined 
in the various states. Since that time, the serious public demand 
for access to the sea has been expanded by the widespread pursuit 
of such recreational activities as water skiing ... and a much more 
widespread desire to hunt, fish, swim, and sun-bathe.28 
It is submitted that despite the well-settled construction of the Colo-
nial Ordinance, the Supreme Judicial Court could have reinterpreted 
it consonant with its ultimate purpose-furthering the public 
interest-by recognizing the modern public interest in recreation. 
Such an interpretation, by recognizing a public right of access to the 
shoreland for recreational purposes, would have avoided the finding 
of an unconstitutional taking. 
The Court also briefly discussed and rejected the exercise of the 
state's police power, as opposed to its eminent domain power, as a jus-
tification for the bill. 29 The Court noted that although the line be-
tween a valid exercise of the police power, for which no compensation 
is required, and a "taking" of property for which compensation is re-
quired is sometimes elusive, the "permanent physical intrusion into 
the property of private persons, which the bill would establish, is a 
24 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1074,313 N.E.2d at 567. 
25 ld. 
26 Michaelson, 342 Mass. at 257, 173 N.E.2d at 277. 
27 Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 70. 
28 1 R. Clark, supra note 14, § 36.4(B), at 201-02. 
29 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1074-76, 313 N.E.2d at 567-68. 
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taking of property within even the most narrow construction of that 
phrase possible under the Constitutions of the Commonwealth and of 
the United States."30 And although there may be a strong desire on 
the public's part to use the shore area for recreation, the Supreme 
Court has noted that "a strong public desire to improve the public 
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter 
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change."31 
Other jurisdictions. Grants by the state of coastal land in Mas-
sachusetts give the owners title to the low water mark, in contrast to 
the great majority of the states, in which ownership normally extends 
only to the high water mark. 32 This distinction is important since the 
area between the high and low water marks is often dry beach area 
suitable for public recreation and can also provide a means of access 
to the ocean. When a state following the general common law rule 
makes a grant of shore land to a private party, the interests of the 
public must be protected.33 Although the Supreme Judicial Court has 
interpreted the Colonial Ordinance as reserving only certain specified 
rights to the public, other states, not bound by such a statute, are 
more flexible and find that the public interests in such land includes 
more than just the traditional rights of navigation and fishing. 
New Jersey is one of the coastal states which follows the majority 
rule, under which land below the mean high water mark is held for 
the benefit of the public, which has certain rights in the land.34 In 
Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea35 the New Jersey 
Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether an oceanfront 
municipality may charge nonresidents higher fees than residents for 
the use of its beach area. The plaintiff borough attacked a dis-
criminatory beach use fee set up by the defendant borough,36 claim-
ing a common law right of access to the ocean in all citizens based on 
the public trust doctrine. 37 The court noted that "[t]he original pur-
pose of the doctrine was to preserve for the use of all the public 
30 Id. at 1075,313 N.E.2d at 568. 
31 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
32 I R. Clark, supra note 14, § 36.3(C), at 193-94. Maine and New Hampshire follow 
the Massachusetts rule. Virginia, Delaware, Pennsylvania and Connecticut recognize 
some private interests to low water. The rest of the states extend private ownership only 
to the high water mark. ld., § 36.3(C), at 194. 
33 The state must retain control of the land to protect the public interests, including, 
but not necessarily limited to navigation and fishing, unless the grant is for the im-
provement of navigation or other use in the public interest. Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. 
at 453. 
34 See text at notes 4-6 supra. 
35 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972). 
36 Avon owned the land up to the high water mark, and the sand area had been ded-
icated for public beach recreational purposes and was used for access to the water, as 
well as for sun-bathing, etc. Id. at 299-300, 294 A.2d at 49. 
37 Id. at 302, 294 A.2d at 51. See text at notes 4-6 supra. 
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natural water resources for navigation and commerce .... "38 The 
court added that "the statements in our cases of an unlimited power 
in the legislature to convey such trust lands to private persons may 
well be too broad,"39 and that prior grants of land may be impliedly 
impressed with certain obligations on the grantee's part to use the 
conveyed lands consistently with the public rights therein.40 The court 
then discussed what public rights might exist in such lands and re-
fused to limit itself to the traditional rights: 
We have no difficulty in finding that, in this latter half of the 
twentieth century, the public rights in tidal lands are not limited 
to the ancient prerogatives of navigation and fishing, but extend 
as well to recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and 
other shore activities. The public trust doctrine, like all common 
law principles, should not be considered fixed or static, but should 
be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs 
of the public it was created to benefit.H 
This expansion of the traditional common law public rights in tidal 
land is in marked contrast to Massachusetts law, under which public 
rights in such land have remained static. 
The traditional common law rule has also been expanded in 
California. In Cion v. City of Santa Cruz, 42 the Supreme Court of 
California used the common law doctrine of dedication to find that 
certain beach areas had been impliedly dedicated to the use of the 
public.43 The Cion decision involved two consolidated cases. One was a 
dispute over ownership of shoreline property between the fee owner 
of the property and the city of Santa Cruz, which at various times had 
exercised control over the property in question for the benefit of the 
public by such acts as posting warning signs and performing repairs.44 
The lower court ruled that although the plaintiff landowners owned 
the land in fee, there was a public easement for recreational 
purposes. 45 In the second case, members of the public sued to enjoin 
38 Id. at 304, 294 A.2d at 52. Note that these are the same public rights protected by 
the Massachusetts colonial ordinance. Therefore, it appears that the authors of the co-
lonial ordinance may have recognized the necessity of protecting the public trust, and it 
can be argued that as the public trust doctrine expands, so should the public rights pro-
tected by the Ordinance. 
39 61 N.J. at 308, 294 A.2d at 54. 
40 ld. 
41 Id. at 309, 294 A.2d at 54. 
42 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970). 
43 Common law dedication could be proved by showing acquiescence of the owner in 
use of the land that negated the idea that the use is under a license, or by establishing 
open and continuous use by the public for a certain period. Id. at 38, 465 P.2d at 55, 
84 Cal. Rptr. at 167. 
44 Id. at 34-36, 465 P.2d at 52-54, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 164-66. 
45 Id. at 35, 465 P.2d at 53-54, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 165-66. 
49
Huber: Chapter 16: Zoning and Land Use
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1974
§ 16.30 ZONING AND LAND USE 395 
land owners from blocking access to an ocean beach.46 The lower 
court ruled for the defendants, holding that a mere widespread public 
use does not lead to an implied dedicationY 
The California Supreme Court upheld the first decision and re-
versed the second, finding an implied dedication of land in both 
instances.48 Applying the common law rule of dedication quite liber-
ally to the facts of the cases, the court held that: 
The present fee owners of the lands in question have of course 
made it clear that they do not approve of the public use of the 
property. Previous owners, however, by ignoring the widespread 
public use of the land for more than five years have impliedly 
dedicated the property to the public. 49 
The California court was apparently responding to a public need 
for recreational areas, and expanded the concept of dedication into a 
new area. 50 In determining whether to apply the doctrine of dedica-
tion to shoreline property, the court stated that "we must observe the 
strong policy expressed in the Constitution and statutes of this state of 
encouraging public use of shoreline recreational areas."51 
It is unlikely that the doctrine of dedication could effectively be 
used in Massachusetts in lieu of the proposed statute. Although com-
mon law dedication in Massachusetts is technically similar to the rule 
in California and other states, 52 it is apparently more difficult to 
prove an implied dedication of land in Massachusetts. 5 3 Furthermore, 
there appear to be no recent cases in Massachusetts upholding com-
mon law dedications, nor do there appear to be any which show any 
tendency to apply the doctrine as liberally as in Cion. It should also be 
noted that whereas California law embodies a presumption in favor of 
public ownership of land between high and low water,54 Massachusetts 
46 Id. at 36-38, 465 P.2d at 54-55, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 166-67. 
47 Id. at 38, 465 P.2d at 55, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 167. 
48 Id. at 43, 465 P.2d at 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 171. 
49 Id. at 44, 465 P.2d at 60, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 172. 
50 The dedication concept has been used most extensively in the area of public roads. 
I d. at 41, 465 P.2d at 58, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 170. 
51 Id. at 42, 465 P.2d at 58, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 170. Cal. Civil Code § 830 (West 1954) 
states that, absent specific language to the contrary, private ownership of uplands ends 
at the high-water mark. 
52 See, e.g., Hemphill v. City of Boston, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 195 (1851), where dedica-
tion is defined as "the gift of land, by the owner, for a way, and an acceptance of the 
gift by the public, either by some express act of acceptance, or by strong implication 
.... " ld. at 196. 
53 Compare, e.g., Gion v. Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 
(1970) with Longley v. Worcester, 304 Mass. 580, 24 N.E.2d 533 (1940). In Longley, the 
court said: "The owner's acts and declarations should be deliberate, unequivocal and 
decisive, manifesting a clear intention permanently to abandon his property to the 
specific public use." Id. at 588, 24 N.E.2d at 537. 
54 Cion, 2 Cal. 3d at 42, 465 P.2d at 58, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 170. 
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obviously has no such presumption, since the effect of the Colonial 
Ordinance is to extend private ownership to the extreme low water 
mark. 
Additionally, the long term usefulness of the doctrine of dedication 
is highly questionable. After Cion, owners of coastal land will be reluc-
tant to allow any use of it by the public, lest such use blossom into a 
permanent easement. Furthermore, the burden in such cases is on the 
public to prove an implied dedication since they are attacking the 
landowner's right to exclude outsiders from his property. Landowners 
might decide to attempt to exclude the public from their property, 
forcing them to go to court to prove an implied dedication, and if the 
public is unable to meet this burden, the present owners would be 
free to close off the land. The net effect, were the courts consciously 
to adopt such a policy in Massachusetts, might be to decrease the 
amount of coastal land available for public use; land owners presently 
lax about keeping members of the public off their beaches might sud-
denly decide to totally exclude them. Furthermore, the amount of 
shore land that courts could reasonably find "dedicated" is probably 
far less than sufficient to meet the recreational needs of the public. 
II. TAKING UNDER THE EMINENT DoMAIN PowER 
After determining that the proposed bill would constitute a "taking" 
of property for which compensation is required,55 the Supreme Judi-
cial Court went on to discuss the measure as an attempted exercise of 
the power of eminent domain. However, the language of the bill indi-
cates that the House wished to grant the public a right of passage 
over coastal lands without compensating the owners of such lands. 56 
In view of the high cost involved, it is highly unlikely the proposed 
bill would be passed if compensation were required. 
"Public purpose" requirement. The first constitutional requirement 
for taking private property is that the taking be for a public 
purpose. 57 Such public purpose does not have to be explicitly men-
tioned in the bill, however, since an act is entitled to a presumption 
that the taking is for a public purpose.58 The Supreme Judicial Court 
55 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1076, 313 N.E.2d at 568. 
56 The bill talks of the on-foot free right-of-passage as being one of the reserved in-
terests of the public in the coastal land of Massachusetts, thereby evidencing the belief 
of the bill's drafters that the public has a right to pass over this land which need not be 
purchased. Mass. H.R. Doc. No. 481 (1974). 
57 This is true under both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article X of the Declaration of Rights of the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Mass. Const. pt. I, art. X. 
58 Caleb Pierce, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 354 Mass. 306, 308-09, 237 N.E.2d 63, 65 
(1968). 
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stated that the creation of the proposed right of passage would serve 
the recognized public interest in recreational facilities, 59 a position 
that seems to be in accord with precedent. 60 
Provision for compensation. Having found a public purpose to val-
idate the taking it found implicit in the bill, the Court then questioned 
whether the bill provided for adequate compensation to owners whose 
land was taken. The bill permitted a petition by a person having a re-
corded interest in the land to determine whether the activities au-
thorized by the bill constituted an "injury" for which the owner was 
entitled to compensation. 61 The Court noted that by using the word 
"injury" rather than "taking," the House may have intended to apply 
the compensation provision only to indirect injury to the upland 
property of tidal land owners, and not to the taking of property. 62 
This interpretation is consistent with the theory of the bill, which 
merely authorizes the exercise of reserved public rights and does not 
"take" anyone's property, as well as with the fact that the House un-
doubtedly does not wish to expend the money that would be neces-
sary to purchase easements across all shore land held by private par-
ties. As the Court noted, if the bill is interpreted as only providing for 
compensation for certain indirect injuries to the upland and not for 
the appropriation itself, then it is plainly deficient in failing to provide 
for compensation. 63 
Even if the word "injury" in the bill could be construed to include 
the act of taking public easements, the Court held that the method 
the bill provided for compensation was inadequate. 64 The first defi-
ciency in the method provided for compensation was that the bill 
would have given only those owners who have a recorded interest in 
coastal land the opportunity to petition for compensation. 65 Since no 
provision was made for compensating owners holding title by unre-
59 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1076, 313 N.E.2d at 568. 
60 As early as 1913, the Supreme Judicial Court stated: "The acquirement of beaches 
by eminent domain and at the public expense for bathing and other purposes of gen-
eral utility has never been questioned in this Commonwealth." Salisbury Land & Im-
provement Co. v. Commonwealth, 215 Mass. 371, 374, 102 N.E. 619, 621 (1913). 
61 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1067 n.1, 313 N.E.2d at 564 n.l. 
62 Id. at 1076-77, 313 N.E.2d at 569. See Cann v. Commonwealth,353 Mass. 71, 228 
N.E.2d 67 (1967), where the Court noted that "[a) distinction between a 'taking' of 
property and other 'injury' to property has been developed in recognition of the fact 
that the Constitution compels compensation only if 'the property of any individual 
should be appropriated to public uses'." Id. at 74, 228 N.E.2d at 68, citing Mass. Const. 
pt. 1, art. X; Connor v. Metropolitan Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 314 Mass. 33, 36-37, 
49 N.E.2d 593, 595 (1943). 
63 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1077, 313 N.E.2d at 569. 
64 Id. It is not surprising that the bill is weak in this area; since the House was not 
intending to take private property, it was undoubtedly not concerned with complying 
with due process restrictions on the exercise of the eminent domain power. 
65 Id. at 1067 n.1, 313 N.E.2d at 564 n.l. 
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corded deed or adverse possession, 66 the proposed bill was constitu-
tionally inadequate. 67 
The second deficiency noted by the Court was that the bill seem-
ingly allowed the courts to decide whether or not to compensate a 
landowner. 68 Under the wording of the bill, any person having a re-
corded interest in affected land may petition the courts "to determine 
whether this section [of the proposed bill] or the activities authorized 
herein constitute an i~ury for which the owner is entitled to compen-
sation .... "69 It cannot be denied that the courts have a place in the 
process of compensating landowners for takings of their property; for 
example, an act may provide that a jury assess damages incident to 
the exercise of the power of eminent domain. 70 Nor can it be denied 
that the legislature may delegate its power of eminent domain. 71 
However, can it delegate to the courts the decision on whether or not 
compensation is due at all? 
If the legislature delegated to the courts the power to decide 
whether certain land should be taken, it would be much easier to find 
an invalid delegation of power, since determining the necessity of tak-
ing specific parcels of land is solely a legislative function. 72 Likewise, 
legislation which provided that courts decide whether compensation 
should be paid for lands taken would also be invalid, since constitu-
tional provisions compel compensation if a taking actually occurs. 
However, if the legislature merely allowed the courts to decide 
whether certain lands had been taken, it would seem that the courts 
would merely be exercising their traditional function of fact-finding. 
The Supreme Judicial Court's discussion of this problem is some-
what cryptic. As written, the bill was construed by the Court to 
amount to a taking of property for which compensation is required. 
Therefore, any landowner who brought a petition for compensation 
should be compensated if it were found that he owned land between 
high and low water mark. What the Court really may be concerned 
about, rather than an invalid delegation of power, is that by requiring 
landowners to bring petitions for compensation instead of directly 
providing for compensation in the bill, the legislature has placed the 
66 Adverse possession is a sufficient interest to entitle a party to compensation f(ll· a 
taking, even where the adverse possession has not yet ripened into title. Andrew v. 
Nantasket Beach R.R., 152 Mass. 506, 507, 25 N.E. 966, 967 (1890). 
67 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1079, 313 N.E.2d at 570. 
""!d. at 1077-78, 313 N.E.2d at 569. 
69 Id. at 1067 n.l, 313 N.E.2d at 564 n.l. 
7° Frost Coal Co. v. City of Boston, 259 Mass. 354, 358-59, !56 N .E. 676, 677 ( 1927). 
71 Burnham v. Mayor & Aldermen, 309 Mass. 388, 389, 35 N.E.2d 242, 243 (1941); 
Hingham & Quincy Bridge & Turnpike Corp. v. County of Norf<llk, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 
353, 360 (1863). 
72 Caleb Pierce, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 354 Mass. 306, 309, 237 N .E.2d 63, 65 
(1968); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 709 (1923). 
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initial burden on the landowner to initiate a judicial proceeding to re-
ceive compensation. In a full and fair exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain, the amount of compensation is set by an agency so em-
powered by the legislature or by a jury or commissioners in a judicial 
proceeding brought against the landowner to take his land, and if the 
owner is dissatisfied he may petition for review, or may appeal. 73 This 
problem appears to be caused by the fact that the legislature appar-
ently never intended this measure to be an exercise of the eminent 
domain power, and was merely providing that the courts determine 
whether the exercise of the public right of passage would constitute 
an actual injury to-as opposed to a taking of-the land in cases 
brought before it. As such, the bill seems to run afoul of the rule that 
an act appropriating private property to public use must reflect the 
intention to exercise the power of eminent domain, 74 and should be 
declared invalid since it does not. 
Adequacy of notice. The final weakness the Court found in the 
proposed bill was its notice provision. The bill provided for (1) notice 
by publication in newspapers of general circulation and (2) recording 
of notice in every county where coastal land is required to be 
recorded. 75 The Court, citing applicable United States Supreme Court 
decisions, 76 found that these methods of notice did not satisfy the due 
process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment since they were 
not "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise in-
terested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an op-
portunity to present their objections. "77 The Court pointed out that 
notice by publication is "inadequate when the names and addresses of 
the affected persons are available" 78 and that such information was 
available from the local assessors of the cities and towns in which the 
73 6 ]. Sackman, Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain §§ 24.112-113, at 24-19 to -21 
(1972). 
74 Glover v. City of Boston, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 282, 288 (1859); Boston & L.R.R. v. 
Salem & L.R.R., 68 Mass. (2 Gray) I, 36-37 (1854). 
75 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1067 n.l, 313 N.E.2d at 564 n.l. 
76 Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (newspaper publication and 
posted notices not sufficient in condemnation proceeding); Walker v. City of Hutchin-
son, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (newspaper publication not sufficient in condemnation pro-
ceeding); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (notice 
by publication of a judicial settlement of accounts in a common trust fund insufficient 
as to known beneficiaries because not reasonably calculated to reach those who could 
easily be informed by other means). 
77 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1079-80, 313 N.E.2d at 570, quoting Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306-14 (1950). Of course, if the bill were held to 
be either a mere authorization to the public to exercise their reserved rights in the land 
or a valid exercise of the police power, then there would presumably be no notice prob-
lem, since no one would be deprived of property so as to trigger the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
78 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1080, 313 N.E.2d at 570. See Mullane v. Central Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950). 
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affected land was located. 79 The Court added that recording of notice 
would "not significandy increase the likelihood that the taking will 
come to the attention of affected owners before the two year period 
expires."80 The bill is especially defective because the failure of a 
landowner to receive notice would eventually terminate his right to 
receive compensation altogether, rather than merely allowing the state 
to set a compensation figure on its own. 
III. CoNCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Supreme Judicial Court seems to be on solid 
ground in expressing its doubts as to the constitutionality of the 
proposed bill. The Court could not have held that the public has a re-
served right of passage in privately owned land between mean high 
and extreme low water lines without overruling the well-established 
judicial interpretation of the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-4 7. 81 Nor 
does it appear that the measure can be justified as an exercise of the 
police power. 82 
If the proposed bill is viewed as constituting a "taking" of property 
for which compensation is constitutionally required, it appears to be 
defective in a number of ways. 83 As has already been mentioned, this 
is undoubtedly due to the legislature's view of the bill as an authoriza-
tion to the public to exercise a reserved right they have in the shore 
land, rather than as an exercise of the power of eminent domain. 84 It 
seems safe to say that following this opinion, the legislature will refuse 
to pass the bill rather than correct it to provide for compensation to 
landowners whose land would be "taken" by the act. 
79 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1080, 313 N.E.2d at 571. 
80 Id., 313 N.E.2d at 570. 
ROBERT L. ROSSI 
[S]ince there is no requirement that the notice be indexed or recorded on the cer-
tificate of registration of registered land, such notice will not be specifically di-
rected to the affected land .... [O]wners rarely have recourse to the registries of 
deeds other than on the sale or purchase of real estate. 
I d. 
81 See cases cited in 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1072-74, 313 N.E.2d at 566-67. 
82 See text at notes 29-31. 
83 See text at notes 55-80. 
84 See text at notes 62-63. 
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